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KILLING THE GOLDEN GOOSE: 
 THE DANGERS OF STRENGTHENING DOMESTIC TRADE SECRET RIGHTS  




16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 172 (2014) 
 
ABSTRACT 
Hackers all over the world exploit our reliance on computer systems 
to take American trade secrets. The response will likely be a dramatic 
strengthening of trade secret law. Congress has already passed statutes 
strengthening trade secret law, and more bills are pending. The alarmist 
rhetoric on cyber-risks to trade secrets, however, ignores the most 
dangerous risk. By over-reacting to the threat of cyber-misappropriation, 
we may suppress the innovation and competition that produce our trade 
secrets in the first place. This paper uses an array of studies on cyber-risks 
and trade secret litigation to show that bolstering trade secret rights will 
have little effect on cyber-misappropriation. The evidence indicates that 
trade secret holders cannot and will not pursue cyber-misappropriators in 
court for technological and business reasons, not for legal reasons. Worse, 
strengthening trade secret law will cause significant collateral damage. 
Trade secret holders will use stronger trade secret rights in other types of 
misappropriation cases to impede follow-on innovation, restrict worker 
mobility, dampen competition, and hamper public access to useful 
information. In short, the costs outweigh the benefits of bolstering trade 
secret law to combat cyber-misappropriation of trade secrets. 
                                                
* Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law. The author would like to 
thank Sharon Sandeen and David Levine for their comments and Mackenzie Flynn and 
Ryan McCaffrey for their research assistance. Mistakes, if any, are the sole responsibility 
of the author. 
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In one of Aesop’s fables, a farmer had a goose that laid golden eggs.  
Hoping to discover the source of the gold, he killed the goose. The farmer 
found nothing, and that, of course, was the end of the golden eggs. 
In 21st century America, a different form of golden eggs is under 
threat—immensely valuable trade secrets encompassing much of the 
innovation and business strategy that power our economy. Cyber-hackers 
all over the world have dedicated their efforts to breaching American 
companies, research institutions, and government agencies to take them. 
Many of these hackers are well-organized and well-financed. Some are even 
state-sponsored. In January 2013, for example, the security firm Mandiant 
reported that a unit of the Chinese army had breached 115 American 
companies, sometimes retaining clandestine access over the course of 
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years.1 The problem of cyber-intrusion is pervasive and growing. For 
example, in one survey in 2011, companies reported an average of 1.4 
successful attacks per week, a 44 percent increase from the previous year.2  
Our worries over losing trade secrets to cyber-intruders, however, 
may lead us to kill our own golden goose—the vigorous competition and 
culture of innovation that produce our trade secrets.  
One of our greatest strengths as a nation is our innovative and 
entrepreneurial culture. Our country produced the airplane, the assembly 
line, the laser, the personal computer, the internet . . . the list goes on and 
on.3 Innovation is a key driver of U.S. economic growth and national 
competitiveness.4 
The success of American innovation stems from many factors—
capital markets, an educated populace, infrastructure, funding for basic 
research, among others—but one important factor is our system of 
intellectual property law, particularly trade secret law.5  
                                                
1 MANDIANT, APT 1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS 21 (Jan. 2013), 
available at http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf [hereinafter 
MANDIANT APT 1].  
2 PONEMON INSTITUTE, SECOND ANNUAL COST OF CYBER CRIME STUDY: BENCHMARK 
STUDY OF U.S. COMPANIES 2 (Aug. 2011), available at 
http://www.hpenterprisesecurity.com/collateral/report/2011_Cost_of_Cyber_Crime_Study
_August.pdf [hereinafter PONEMON STUDY].   
3 JAMES WEI, GREAT INVENTIONS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 218 (airplane), 278 
(internet) (Wiley 2012); DAVID E. NYE, AMERICA’S ASSEMBLY LINE 36 (MIT Press 2013), 
available at http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/americas-assembly-line (assembly line); 
American Institute of Physics, Bright Ideas: The First Lasers, 
http://www.aip.org/history/exhibits/laser/sections/whoinvented.html (lasers). 
4 CHARLES SCHULTZE, MEMOS TO THE PRESIDENT: A GUIDE THROUGH MACROECONOMICS 
FOR THE BUSY POLICYMAKER 299 (1991); ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION 
AND THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
THE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS v (March 2012), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf. 
5 U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., THE COMPETITIVENESS AND INNOVATIVE CAPACITY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 2-1 (Jan. 2012), available at 
http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2012/january/competes_010511_0
.pdf (finding that three factors that form the basis of a strong innovative environment are 
support for education, research, and infrastructure); THOMAS SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS: 
A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO THE ECONOMY 301-02 (Basic Books 4th ed. 2011)  
(discussing the importance of capital markets to support entrepreneurial activity); CHARLES 
SCHULTZE, MEMOS TO THE PRESIDENT: A GUIDE THROUGH MACROECONOMICS FOR THE 
BUSY POLICYMAKER 304 (1991) (suggesting that more engineering degrees leads to greater 
development of useful ideas); Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: 
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not), NAT’L 
BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, WORKING PAPER NO. 7552 at 11 (2000), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf (“secrecy and lead time are ranked comparably 
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In essence, a trade secret is information that derives value from not 
being known to competitors. Trade secrets play a critical role in supporting 
innovation in the United States. For example, in one study, secrecy ranked 
first or second in importance for product innovations in “twenty-four of the 
thirty-three surveyed industries.”6 Trade secret law particularly favors small 
companies, which tend to be engines of innovation, because the hurdles to 
obtaining trade secret protection are relatively low.7 In contrast to patent 
law, trade secrets require only reasonable efforts at secrecy from the trade 
secret holder to earn legal protection.8 Moreover, trade secret protection 
may potentially last forever.9  
Trade secret law, however, like other areas of intellectual property 
law, must strike a careful balance. Too little protection results in inadequate 
incentives to develop useful information and wasteful expenditures on 
protection.10 Too much protection causes harm in a number of different 
ways. By granting too much of a monopoly on trade secret information, 
trade secret law prevents companies from competing to provide better 
products using that information.11 Over-protection also decreases worker 
mobility by preventing employees with knowledge of their employers’ trade 
secrets from departing to work for competitors or to start their own 
companies.12 This restricts personal freedom and economic dynamism. 
Monopolies on trade secret information inhibit follow-on innovation, a 
problem because most innovation builds on innovation.13 Finally, over-
broad trade secret law limits free speech and restricts the flow of 
information important to the public.14 For example, natural gas companies 
                                                                                                                       
overall as the two most effective appropriability mechanisms for product innovations”) 
[hereinafter Cohen].  
6 Cohen, supra note 5, at 13.  
7 See Cohen, supra note 5, at 7, 14-16; see also Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the 
Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 18 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. 
ACTIVITY 783 (1987); CHI RESEARCH, INC., SMALL BUS. ADMIN., SMALL SERIAL 
INNOVATORS: THE SMALL FIRM CONTRIBUTION TO TECHNICAL CHANGE 3 (2003), 
available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs225tot.pdf (small businesses develop 
thirteen times more patents per employee than large businesses). 
8 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985); Mark A. Lemley, The 
Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 313 
(2008) [hereinafter Surprising Virtues]. 
9 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 494 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(noting that trade secret law offers protection of unlimited duration). 
10 See infra Part I.B. 
11 See infra Part I.B. 
12 See infra Part I.B. 
13 See infra Part I.B. 
14 See infra Part I.B. 
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shield information about their potentially dangerous hydraulic fracturing 
practices from regulators and the public by arguing that they are trade 
secrets.15  
The rhetoric among political leaders on trade secret cyber-
misappropriation ignores this delicate balance of conflicting policy 
concerns. An otherwise obscure area of the law, trade secrets have been the 
subject of an unprecedented level of attention recently due to concerns 
about cyber-hacking. President Obama, high-ranking members of his 
administration, and members of Congress have all loudly voiced concern.16 
Fueled in part by national security concerns about the cyber-hacking of 
military secrets, the rhetoric from these political leaders has tended to be 
alarmist, protectionist, and moralistic.  
This one-sided concern with protecting trade secrets is leading to a 
dramatic strengthening of trade secret law. The Obama administration is 
now conducting a legislative review to determine if more legislation is 
needed to enhance enforcement against trade secret theft.17 And a number of 
parties are advocating strengthening civil trade secret law by federalizing it. 
Indeed, four bills have recently been proposed in Congress to federalize 
                                                
15 Travis D. Van Ort, Hydraulic Fracturing Additives: A Solution to the Tension Between 
Trade Secret Protection and Demands for Public Disclosure, 4 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & 
NAT. RESOURCES L. 439, 440, 458 (2012); Mike Soraghan, In Fracking Debate, 
‘Disclosure’ is in the Eye of the Beholder, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/06/21/21greenwire-in-fracking-debate-disclosure-is-
in-the-eye-of-19087.html. 
16 See, e.g., Pres. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Securing our Nation’s 
Infrastructure (May 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Securing-Our-
Nations-Cyber-Infrastructure; Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security 
Agency, Keynote Address at American Enterprise Institute on Cybersecurity and American 
Power (July 9, 2012), available at http://www.aei.org/events/2012/07/09/cybersecurity-
and-american-power/; 159 CONG. REC. S3165-66 (daily ed. May 7, 2013) (statement of 
Sen. Carl Levin); Cyber Espionage and the Theft of U.S. Intellectual Property and 
Technology Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 113th Cong. (July 9, 
2013) (statement of Tim Murphy, H. Rep.), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/Heari
ngs/OI/20130709/HHRG-113-IF02-MState-M001151-20130709.pdf; Chinese 
Telecommunications Investigation Open Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. 
on Intelligence, 112th Cong. (2012) (Opening Statement of Dutch Ruppersberger, H. Rep., 
Md., 2nd Cong. Dist.), available at 
http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/09122012Dutch
Opening.pdf. 
17 OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON 
MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 12 (Feb. 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on_mitigating_th
e_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY].   
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civil trade secret law by adding a private right of action to the Economic 
Espionage Act (EEA).18 This would significantly increase the rights of 
those wishing to protect information. 
 Strengthening trade secret law, however, will likely do little to 
combat cyber-misappropriation. This paper uses an array of studies of 
cyber-risks and trade secret litigation to show that trade secret holders 
cannot and will not pursue cyber-misappropriators in court for technological 
and business reasons, not for legal reasons. Worse, strengthening trade 
secrets will cause significant collateral damage. Trade secret holders will 
use stronger trade secret rights in other types of misappropriation cases in 
ways that will impede follow-on innovation, restrict worker mobility, 
dampen competition, and hamper public access to useful information, 
including for purposes of free speech. In short, the political rhetoric ignores 
the fact that the costs outweigh the benefits of bolstering trade secret law to 
respond to cyber-misappropriation of trade secrets. 
The argument is set forth in the following three parts. Part I outlines 
trade secret doctrine and policy, explaining how trade secret doctrine 
balances conflicting policy concerns. Part II discusses the cybersecurity 
threat to American trade secrets and the political response. This part shows 
how the political rhetoric has linked protecting trade secrets to emotionally 
resonant issues, including national security and job loss, and is leading to 
the strengthening of trade secret law. Part III shows how expanding trade 
secret rights, particularly by adding the private party right of action under 
the EEA, would likely harm innovation as well as other policy interests.   
I. TRADE SECRET LAW 
Trade secret law in America has its origins in 19th century state 
common law.19 In 1837, a Massachusetts court issued the first known 
American opinion recognizing limited rights in secret information.20 By 
1939, the American Law Institute had identified a set of commonly 
                                                
18 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014, S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014); Future of American 
Innovation and Research Act of 2013, S. 1770, 113th Cong. (2013); Private Right of 
Action Against Theft of Trade Secrets Act of 2013, H.R. 2466, 113th Cong. (2013); 
Protecting American Trade Secrets and Innovation Act of 2012, S. 3389, 112th Cong. 
(2012).  
19 MELVIN F. JAGER, 1 TRADE SECRETS LAW § 2.3 (2013) (recounting the development of 
trade secret law).  
20 Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (1 Pick.) 523, 526 (1837) (enforcing a covenant to sell rights 
to a secret art of making chocolate); Surprising Virtues, supra note 8, at 316. 
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accepted principles of trade secret law in the First Restatement of Torts.21 In 
1979, in response to the lack of uniformity among states’ common law and 
ambiguity on some legal issues, the ALI promulgated the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act (UTSA).22  
Now, all U.S. states and the District of Columbia have adopted the 
UTSA in some form, except for New York and Massachusetts.23 Despite 
these holdouts and some variations in the version of the UTSA adopted, 
civil trade secret law is largely the same across the country.24  
Trade secret rights tend to be protected through this civil law. 
Although there is a federal criminal law addressing trade secrets and many 
states have criminal trade secret statutes,25 trade secret rights are rarely 
enforced through criminal law. Only about two percent of state trade secret 
cases resulting in an appellate opinion involve a state criminal trade secret 
statute.26 On the federal level, trade secret misappropriation is prosecuted 
through the Economic Espionage Act.27 However, these cases are 
infrequent. Substantive trade secret law in the courts is almost always state 
                                                
21 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757-59 (1939); JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS 
§ 2.02[1] (2000) (stating that for over forty years after its publication in 1939, the 
Restatement (First) of Torts “was almost universally cited by state courts, and in effect 
became the bedrock of modern trade secret law”). 
22 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985) prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 433, 434 
(1990) (noting the “undue uncertainty concerning the parameters of trade secret protection” 
and the “confused status” of the law); see also Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade 
Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Following the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 502-20 (2010) (providing a detailed account 
of the drafting of the UTSA). The ALI issued a revised version in 1985. See id. 
23 See 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 3:29, n.1 (2013) (providing citations to 
statutes enacting the UTSA in 47 states and the District of Columbia). Texas enacted Texas 
Senate Bill 953 on May 3, 2013, after this version of the Jager text was printed. The bill 
went into effect on September 1, 2013. However, some states, particularly North Carolina 
and Alabama, have adopted versions of the statute which vary significantly from the 
UTSA. See Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1633, 1657 (1998). 
24 See JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 2.03[7](c) (2013) (“It is true that the similarities 
in substance among state enactments are far greater than the differences in language used.”) 
Even where the language of the law differs, courts’ interpretations are similar. See id. at 
§ 2.01[1] (“Usually what is seen as ‘improper means’ in Illinois will be similarly seen in 
California . . . .”) 
25 See 18 U.S.C. § 1831 et seq. (federal criminal statute); 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE 
SECRETS LAW, app. L3 (1990) (providing state criminal statutes). 
26 David S. Almeling, et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State 
Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 76 (2010-2011) [hereinafter State Study]. 
27 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831 et seq. 
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law.28 As a result, this paper will focus its discussion of trade secret law on 
the UTSA as broadly representative of trade secret law across the states. 
A. Trade Secret Doctrine 
Proving a claim of trade secret misappropriation essentially requires 
establishing two elements: that the plaintiff possesses a trade secret and that 
the trade secret has been misappropriated.29 With regard to the trade secret 
element, a trade secret is “information . . . that derives independent 
economic value . . . from not being generally known to [and not] readily 
ascertainable by . . . [those] who can obtain economic value from its 
disclosure or use.”30 Thus, trade secrets must not only be secret, they must 
derive economic value from being secret—essentially a competitive 
advantage.31 Trade secrets, as a result, are not subject matter specific. The 
information protected by trade secret law may constitute any information as 
long as it is valuable because it is secret.32  
In addition, to merit protection as a trade secret, the information at 
issue must be subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.33 What 
constitutes reasonable efforts, of course, lends itself to different 
interpretations. Courts vary as to the level of effort necessary to adequately 
protect a trade secret.34 
The second element, misappropriation, requires the acquisition of a 
trade secret by some form of improper means or the use or disclosure of a 
trade secret in breach of a confidence.35 These two forms of 
                                                
28 David S. Almeling, et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State 
Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 306 (2009-2010) [hereinafter Federal Study]. Finally, some 
courts have interpreted the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) to apply to cases 
involving hacking computer systems to take proprietary data. See Zoe Argento, Whose 
Social Network Account? A Trade Secret Approach to Allocating Rights, 19 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 201, 258 n.307 (2013), available at 
http://www.mttlr.org/volnineteen/argento.pdf. However, this approach to the CFAA is 
controversial. See id. 
29 See 1 MELVIN JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 5:5 (2013) (Jager further divides the 
misappropriation inquiry into two separate elements). 
30 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i). 
31 See id. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. at § 1(4)(b). 
34 See Note, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Cost-Benefit Response to the Fourth 
Amendment Analogy, 106 HARV. L. REV. 461, 463-64 (1992) (discussing the requirement 
of reasonable security precautions).  
35 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2); Surprising Virtues, supra note 8, at 318-19. The 
UTSA also imposes liability for knowingly using or disclosing a trade secret from a third 
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misappropriation—improper means and breach of confidence— correspond 
roughly to two different sets of circumstances in which trade secrets are 
taken, respectively, misappropriation by outsiders and misappropriation by 
insiders.36  
Misappropriation by outsiders generally occurs in the context of 
competitors seeking business intelligence.37 These cases define rights 
between strangers and tend to sound in tort law.38 Improper means include 
not only actions that would be wrongful in themselves, such as theft, but 
also calculated efforts to overcome reasonable secrecy measures.39 Notably, 
the UTSA specifically includes “espionage through electronic or other 
means” as a form of improper means.40 This has been interpreted to cover 
acquiring trade secrets through hacking into computer systems.41 
In contrast, misappropriation by insiders typically involves parties to 
a business relationship, such as departing employees, and tends to sound in 
contract.42 In these cases, misappropriation depends on whether the 
defendant breached an agreement of confidentiality.43 The agreements may 
be explicit, for example, in the form of nondisclosure agreements. They 
may also be implied. In the case of employees, the confidentiality 
agreement is sometimes implied based on the employee’s tacit 
understanding of her employment obligations.44   
                                                                                                                       
party who acquired the trade secret through improper means or a breach of confidence. See 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii)(B). 
36 See Surprising Virtues, supra note 8, at 318-19. 
37 Id. at 317. 
38 See id. 
39 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1); E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 
431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970). 
40 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1). 
41 See, e.g., Physicians Interactive v. Lathian Systems, Inc., 2003 WL 23018270, *8 (E.D. 
Va. 2003) (“There can be no doubt that the use of a computer software robot to hack into a 
computer system and to take or copy proprietary information is an improper means to 
obtain a trade secret, and thus is misappropriation under the VUTSA.”); see also Four 
Seasons Hotels and Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1326 
(S.D. Fla. 2003) (finding that hacking into a computer system constitutes misappropriation 
by espionage through electronic means).  
42 See Surprising Virtues, supra note 8, at 317. 
43 See id. 
44 See, e.g., Am. Bldg. Maint. Co. v. ACME Prop. Servs., 515 F. Supp. 2d 298, 310 
(N.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[Under New York law,] former employees can be restricted from using 
their former employer’s trade secrets to advance their own interests, even when they have 
not signed an employment agreement limiting their activities.”); Premier Lab Supply, Inc. 
v. Chemplex Indus. Inc., 10 So. 3d 202, 206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (holding lack of a 
confidentiality agreement with an employee to whom confidential information is disclosed 
does not by itself defeat trade secret status for the information because an employee who 
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The correlation of outsiders with misappropriation by improper 
means and insiders with misappropriation by breach of confidence is not 
perfect, of course. Insiders may use their existing access to improperly hack 
into trade secrets to which they were not granted access, and outsiders may 
acquire trade secrets through unintended disclosure on the part of the trade 
secret holder.45 However, as the statistics show, insiders in trade secret 
cases tend to exploit access granted them in breach of a confidentiality 
agreement whereas outsiders tend to acquire trade secrets through some 
form of improper means unrelated to a breach of confidence.46  
Likewise, both breaches of confidence and improper means may be 
accomplished through computer systems. The exploitation of internet access 
that has provoked the most public concern recently is the hacking of a trade 
secret holder’s computer system by outsiders, especially foreign 
governments.47 An insider, however, may use her authorized access to the 
employer’s computer system to obtain her employer’s trade secrets. Then, 
she might use her internet access to send the information to a new 
employer.  For purposes of consistency, this paper will refer to the 
acquisition of trade secrets by wrongfully circumventing barriers to access 
in computer system as cyber-misappropriation, whether conducted by 
insiders or outsiders. Cyber-misappropriation, in brief, will refer to 
acquisition by hacking, and not the use of computer systems for other forms 
of use and disclosure of the trade secret.48  
B. Theory and Goals of Trade Secret Law 
The rationale for trade secret rights does not have the coherent 
policy basis of other areas of intellectual property, particularly patent and 
                                                                                                                       
acquires a special technique or process in his employment is, as a matter of law, under a 
duty not to use it for his own benefit or disclose it to others). 
45 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2). 
46 Verizon reported that most cases of insider data breach involve insiders misusing their 
privileges. VERIZON, 2013 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 6 (2013) (“Correlated 
with the 14% of breaches tied to insiders, privilege misuse weighs in at 13%.”), available 
at http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigations-
report-2013_en_xg.pdf [hereinafter VERIZON 2013 REPORT]; 
PRICEWATERSHOUSECOOPERS, KEY FINDINGS FROM THE 2013 US STATE OF CYBERCRIME 
SURVEY CERT STUDY 10 (June 2013), available at 
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/increasing-it-effectiveness/publications/assets/us-state-of-
cybercrime.pdf [hereinafter CERT 2013 SURVEY]. 
47 See infra note 145. 
48 I refer to the definition of “hacking” in the Free Dictionary: “To use one’s skill in 
computer programming to gain illegal or unauthorized access to a file or network.” Free 
Dictionary available at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/hacking.   
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copyright, which rest firmly on an incentive theory set forth in the 
Constitution.49 Trade secret law evolved from torts based on differing 
rationales such as breach of confidence, unfair competition, and trespass to 
property.50 These jumbled roots have led some commentators to describe 
trade secret law as a “doctrine in search of a justification.”51 However, the 
more constructive way to describe the theoretical basis of trade secret law is 
that it consists of multiple theories, each of which tends to pull in the same 
direction. The two principal theories upon which trade secret law rests are 
tort theory and property theory.52  
The tort theory bases trade secret rights on the goal of discouraging 
undesirable conduct. The older version of this approach focuses on 
maintaining standards of business morality, while the modern version seeks 
to discourage unfair competition.53 Both versions, however, aim to 
discourage behavior that leads to wasteful efforts to protect trade secrets 
against discovery.54 As the Fifth Circuit observed, “Our tolerance of the 
espionage game must cease when the protections required to prevent 
another’s spying cost so much that the spirit of inventiveness is 
dampened.”55 The Restatements, UTSA, and most state courts rely on the 
tort theory as the justification for trade secret rights.56 
                                                
49 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of 
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993-1000 (1997). 
50 Surprising Virtues, supra note 8, at 316. 
51 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of 
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 243 (1998).   
52 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (“The maintenance 
of standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention are the broadly 
stated policies behind trade secret law.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
39 cmt. b. (noting that courts both justify trade rights on a property theory and a theory of 
improper conduct). 
53 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Problematic Role of Criminal Law in Regulating Use of 
Information: The Case of the Economic Espionage Act, 80 N.C. L. REV. 853, 886-89 
(2002).  
54 E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1970). 
Similarly, the Supreme Court noted that trade secret law serves the purpose of avoiding 
“detrimental misallocation of resources and economic waste.” Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. 
at 487. 
55 E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 431 F.2d at 1016. 
56 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939) (rejecting the property theory 
in favor of a general duty of good faith); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 39 reporters’ note, cmt. b, 440 (1995) (listing cases); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 
commissioners’ cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990) (“One of the broadly stated 
policies behind trade secret law is ‘the maintenance of standards of commercial ethics.’”); 
1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW §§ 1:3, 1:3 n.16 (noting that standards of 
fairness and commercial morality continue to be the touchstone of trade secret law in the 
courts and listing cases). 
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The property theory views trade secrets as a form of intellectual 
property, like patents or copyright.57 The Supreme Court, in particular, 
identified trade secrets as a form of property in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 
rejecting its earlier view that trade secret rights rested purely on a 
commercial morality justification.58 Commentators and several state courts 
have also accepted this view.59 
Under this approach, trade secret rights serve the purpose of 
providing incentives to develop useful and innovative information by 
granting rights in that information.60 The reasoning proceeds as follows. 
New and valuable information is often costly to develop. A new chemical 
formula or engineering process, for example, may take years and significant 
skill to create. As a result, rational actors will not engage in this investment 
of time and money without hope of compensation for their efforts. Trade 
secrets, however, are merely information and are therefore easily copied.61 
The original developer of the useful information loses the competitive 
advantage that the information gives her when her competitors copy and use 
the information, too. This deprives the developer of the incentive to invest 
in developing it in the first place. By granting legal protection from 
misappropriation, trade secret law preserves the incentive to invest in 
developing useful information.62  
A number of authorities rely on the tort and property approaches 
simultaneously. The Supreme Court, for example, identified both theories 
as justification for trade secret law in Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron 
                                                
57 See, e.g., Surprising Virtues, supra note 8, at 329 (“Trade secrets are best understood not 
as applications or extensions of existing common law principles (warranted or 
unwarranted), but as IP rights.”) 
58 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004, n.9 (1984). The Court argued that its 
earlier decision in E.I. DuPont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland did not deny the 
existence of a property interest in trade secrets but merely stood for the proposition that a 
property interest was unnecessary to decide the case. Id. Nevertheless, Justice Holmes’s 
statement in Masland—“The property may be denied, but the confidence cannot be.”—
seems to be a fairly clear rejection of the property theory. 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).  
59 See, e.g., Surprising Virtues, supra note 8, at 312 (rejecting other theories of trade secret 
law in favor of a property theory); Union Carbide Corp. v. Tarancon Corp., 742 F. Supp. 
1565, 1579 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (Georgia); Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency, 998 F.2d 1550, 
1556 (10th Cir. 1993) (Utah).  
60 See e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1974).; Surprising 
Virtues, supra note 8, at 330. 
61 As Thomas Jefferson stated: “That ideas should freely spread from one to another over 
the globe. . . seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she 
made them, like fire, expansible over all space . . . .” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac 
McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html. 
62 See Surprising Virtues, supra note 8, at 329-30. 
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Corporation: “The maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the 
encouragement of invention are the broadly stated policies behind trade 
secret law.”63 As Judge Posner observed, the two theories are 
complementary. Both aim to encourage wealth creation rather than mere 
redistribution.64 
Under either theory, trade secret law must balance conflicting policy 
concerns. In setting the right standard for conduct under the tort theory, 
trade secret law must balance the promotion of healthy competition and 
innovation against the discouragement of inefficient over-investment in 
self-protection. The public, as a whole, loses when companies devote their 
resources to protecting their ideas from each other.65 However, the public 
also suffers when companies do not compete vigorously with each other.66 
Granting an overbroad monopoly on information prevents companies from 
competing to produce better products and services based on that 
information.67  
The tension between encouraging competition and discouraging 
waste is particularly salient when employees are privy to their employers’ 
trade secrets. Employees may take those trade secrets to a competitor when 
they leave to find a new job. Concern over this possibility may cause the 
first employer not to fully exploit the trade secret because it fears disclosing 
the information to its workers.68  
Restricting employees from leaving also leads to harmful 
consequences. First, the public interest in open competition suffers when 
                                                
63 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). 
64 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178–79 (7th Cir. 
1991). 
65 Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 487 (“In addition to the increased costs for protection from 
burglary, wire-tapping, bribery, and the other means used to misappropriate trade secrets, 
there is the inevitable cost to the basic decency of society when one firm steals from 
another.”) 
66 See Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 435 (Pa. 1960) (noting that “society suffers 
when competition is diminished by slackening the dissemination of ideas, processes and 
methods.”); THOMAS SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS: A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO THE 
ECONOMY 157 (Basic Books 4th ed. 2011) (explaining how competition reduces prices for 
consumers); JOHN M. LEVY, ESSENTIAL MICROECONOMICS FOR PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 
52 (Praeger Publishers 1995) (competition promotes product innovation and product 
differentiation). 
67 See Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 404 N.E.2d 205, 207 (Ill. 1980) (noting 
the public interest in the production of goods unprotected by a valid patent); see also 
Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate 
Spheres to a Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 171 (1997) (stating that “ownership of 
intellectual property confers upon the intellectual property holder a ‘monopoly’”). 
68 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1974). 
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workers are prevented from competing with former employers.69 Second, 
when employees cannot leave, employers do not compete for the best 
employees either through compensation or hiring.70 The worker then has 
little incentive to improve her skills because she will not be compensated 
for her investment through competition among employers.71 A number of 
undesirable consequences result, including reduced innovation, 
productivity, and economic growth.72 
 Restricting employee mobility also decreases innovation by 
impeding the sharing of ideas. When allowed to move from one employer to 
another, employees with skills obtained in one company bring new 
perspectives and solutions to the next company. And the former employer 
benefits from the reciprocal effect; workers leave other companies to join it, 
also bringing fresh ideas with them.73 As Ronald Gilson explains, these 
knowledge spillovers spark a cascade of innovation, continually 
rejuvenating the local economy.74 The cross-pollination effect helps to 
explain the sustained productivity of hotbeds of innovation, like Silicon 
Valley.75  
The property theory implicates a related set of conflicting policies. 
Under the property theory, trade secret law balances providing incentives to 
                                                
69 See Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 433 (Pa. 1960) (noting that preventing a worker 
from using his skills for another employer may harm “the public in general in forestalling, 
to any extent widespread technological advances”). 
70 See ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE 31-38 (Yale University Press 2013); 
Catherine Fisk & Adam Barry, Contingent Loyalty and Restricted Exit: Commentary on the 
Restatement of Employment Law, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 413, 34 (2013), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2060621 (“Studies of how companies motivate employees 
today emphasize that, rather than focusing on how to prevent valuable employees from 
leaving, successful employers implement strategies that encourage them to stay.”).  
71 Id. at 28 (“[E]mployees in strict enforcement jurisdictions will be discouraged from 
investing in their human capital because they know that they will not be able to solicit 
employment offers from outside firms that they could either accept or use as leverage to 
negotiate an increase in their salary at their current employer.”). 
72 Id. at 26, 28-30, 35 (restraining employees’ ability to compete depresses innovation by 
impeding the cross-pollination of skills and ideas between organizations, hampers the 
creation of new firms and entrepreneurial activity, and increases employer search costs). 
73 Anders Malmberg & Dominic Power, (How) Do (Firms in) Clusters Create Knowledge?, 
12 INDUS. & INNOVATION 409, 410 (2005); see generally ORLY LOBEL, supra note 70 
(explaining how the economy benefits when workers are free to move between employers). 
74 Robert H. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: 
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 584-86 
(1999) (explaining that knowledge spillovers between firms leads to the development of 
new products that “reset the industry life cycle”).   
75 Id. at 590-92 (noting that high employee mobility helps to explain why Silicon Valley 
has experienced the development of new industry after new industry). 
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develop useful and innovative information against public access to that 
information. Although the public benefits when companies use their trade 
secrets to provide better products and services, the public would benefit 
more directly by having access to the trade secrets themselves.  
In particular, allowing the trade secret holder exclusive rights to use 
a trade secret inhibits follow-on innovation. This can slow progress, 
because innovation tends to build on previous innovation.76 Indeed, most 
technology, from computers to pharmaceutical drugs, is the outcome of a 
long chain of individual innovations.77 When more people have access to 
useful information, especially competitors trained in that area of 
technology, more people can build upon that information with new 
innovations. As discussed above, public access to innovation also enhances 
competition. Finally, trade secret information is vital to many other public 
interests, such as free speech, safety, and health.78  
To balance these conflicting concerns, trade secret law grants only a 
limited and porous protection to trade secrets. As the Supreme Court 
observed, “trade secret law functions relatively as a sieve.”79 Trade secrets 
are allowed to leak to the public in four principal ways. 
First, other parties may divine a trade secret through reverse 
engineering without fear of liability for misappropriation.80 Reverse 
engineering is the process of figuring out how a product works, often by 
working backwards from the known product to determine the process of its 
manufacture.81 Competitors benefit most directly from the reverse 
engineering exception to misappropriation because many trade secrets are 
                                                
76 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Furman & Scott Stern, Climbing Atop the Shoulders of Giants: The 
Impact of Institutions on Cumulative Research, AM. ECON. REV. 101(5) (2011): 1933–1963 
(noting the general observation that innovation builds on innovation and showing an 
example in the case of biological resource centers).  
77 As Sir Isaac Newton famously observed: “If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the 
shoulders of giants.” STEPHEN HAWKING, Isaac Newton (1642-1727): His Life and Work, 
in ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS 725 (Stephen Hawking ed., 2002).  
78 See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text. 
79 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974). 
80 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Comment to § 1 (“Proper means include: . . . Discovery 
by ‘reverse engineering’, that is, by starting with the known product and working backward 
to find the method by which it was developed.”) However, courts have accepted the 
principle of reverse engineering as a form of proper means to acquire a trade secret for 
more than a century. See, e.g., Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N.E. 12, 13 (1889); Kewanee Oil Co. 
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974); Craig L. Uhrich, The Economic Espionage Act-
Reverse Engineering and the Intellectual Property Public Policy, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 147, 167, n.160 (2001). 
81 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974); EILAM, ELDAD & 
CHIKOFSKY, ELLIOT J., REVERSING: SECRETS OF REVERSE ENGINEERING 3 (John Wiley & 
Sons 2007).  
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too complicated for the average member of the public to reverse engineer.82 
The public, however, benefits in the long run because competitors use the 
information to compete with the original trade secret holder in providing 
better goods and services to the public. Additionally, access by competitors 
provides more scope for follow-on innovation.  
A second type of leakage takes place through departing employees. 
Although an employee is liable for misappropriation if she knowingly takes 
her employer’s trade secrets with her when she leaves, she may take general 
and industry-specific knowledge, even if she learned it on the job.83 For 
example, a welder may take the general welding skills she learned in her 
previous employment to a new employer, but she cannot take her 
knowledge of her employer’s trade secret on the welding compound.  
The line between trade secrets and unprotected general and industry-
specific knowledge, however, can be blurry.84 The definition of a trade 
secret itself is imprecise. What constitutes “reasonable” efforts to maintain 
secrecy and “readily ascertainable” are but two of the issues in establishing 
the existence of a trade secret that call for close line-drawing by the 
courts.85 In addition, as an evidentiary matter, it may be difficult to prove 
that an employee took purely tacit knowledge.86 An employer can prove 
                                                
82 That reverse engineering of trade secret must be challenging is a necessary consequence 
of the requirement that a trade secret not be “readily ascertainable.” See UNIF. TRADE 
SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i). If information was very easy to obtain through reverse engineering, 
then it likely would not qualify as a trade secret because it would be “readily 
ascertainable.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f. 
83 See Basic Chems., Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 220, 227 (Iowa 1977) (“One rather 
salient point runs steadfastly throughout decisions in this area in most jurisdictions, and 
that is that the employee, upon terminating his employment relationship with his employer, 
is entitled to take with him ‘the experience, knowledge, memory, and skill, which he had 
gained while there employed.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 
cmt. d (1995) (“The distinction between trade secrets and general skill, knowledge, 
training, and experience is intended to achieve a reasonable balance between the protection 
of confidential information and the mobility of employees.”). 
84 See Gilson, supra note 74, at 598-99. 
85 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4); Surprising Virtues, supra note 8, at 317. 
86 Some courts have adopted the inevitable disclosure doctrine, but this is controversial and 
rejected by many courts. Under the inevitable disclosure doctrine, a former employee may 
be enjoined from working for a competitor because the court determines that she would 
inevitably user her former employer’s trade secrets for the benefit of her new employer in 
the course of her work. See, e.g., Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 
1995) (enjoining a former employee from working for a competitor on the grounds that he 
would necessarily make decisions for his new employer by relying on his knowledge of his 
former’s employer’s trade secrets). A number of courts have rejected this doctrine as too 
restrictive of employee mobility. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 F.3d 467, 469 
(1st Cir. 1995) (affirming district court’s refusal to grant preliminary injunction restraining 
former employee from working for competitor); Cudahy Co. v. American Labs., Inc., 313 
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misappropriation fairly easily when an employee takes stacks of documents 
containing trade secrets.87 The employer faces a greater challenge in 
proving that the employee took trade secrets stored only in her head. 
Furthermore, courts hesitate to protect information as trade secrets that 
cannot be easily distinguished from a worker’s general skill and 
knowledge.88 As the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition observes: 
“[w]hen a former employee uses information from memory rather than from 
physical records taken from the former employer, courts may be more likely 
to regard the information as part of the employee’s general knowledge and 
experience.”89 Finally, due to the many uncertainties in a trade secret claim, 
trade secret litigation tends to be expensive.90 An employer may therefore 
hesitate to bring suit in a case involving close issues of general or industry-
specific knowledge, thereby allowing some trade secrets to leak out with 
departing employees.91  
 But again, this seepage of useful information benefits the public. 
When employees have the option of leaving, employers must compete to 
retain the best workers. This gives employees more incentive to perform 
well and to invest in professional self-improvement.92 In addition, the cross-
pollination effect above leads to greater innovation, to the benefit of the 
economy and the public.93  
 A third way in which trade secret law allows information to leak to 
the public is through innocent discovery.94 The UTSA and the common law 
                                                                                                                       
F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (D. Neb. 1970) (noting absence of covenant not to compete in 
dismissing unfair business practice claim).  
87 See, e.g., ONCIX 2011 Report, infra note 113, at 2 (defendant arrested with 250,000 
pages of proprietary information in his house). 
88 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d (1995). 
89 Id. 
90 Gilson, supra note 74, at 599; SHARON SANDEEN & ELIZABETH ROWE, TRADE SECRET 
LAW IN A NUTSHELL § 4.12.3 (West 2013); American Intellectual Property Law 
Association, 2013 Report of the Economic Survey (2013), available at 
http://www.patentinsurance.com/custdocs/2013AIPLA%20Survey.pdf. 
91 Gilson, supra note 74, at 600. The trade secret holder can remedy this problem in part by 
requiring employees to sign noncompete agreements restricting departing employees from 
competing with the employer until such time as any trade secret the departing employee 
knows becomes obsolete. Not all states enforce such agreements, however.  See CAL. BUS. 
& PROF. CODE § 16600 (making non-compete agreements unenforceable in California). 
Most states allow courts to strike down or revise such agreements if they seem 
unreasonable, which leads to more expensive litigation. See Viva Moffat, Making Non-
Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 943-51 (2012). 
92 See Fisk & Barry, supra note 70, at 33. 
93 See Gilson, supra note 74, at 591. 
94 See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 476. 
17
Argento: Killing the Golden Goose
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 172 (2014)  2013-2014  
189 
do not impose liability for learning of a trade secret without notice that it is 
secret.95  
 Fourth, the courts allow the disclosure of trade secrets to serve other 
compelling public interests. Trade secret common law generally recognizes 
a privilege to disclose trade secrets “in connection with . . . information that 
is relevant to public health or safety, or to the commission of a crime or tort, 
or other matters of substantial concern.”96 One such interest is free 
speech.  In CBS v. Davis, for example, the Supreme Court held that 
enjoining the disclosure of trade secrets was an unconstitutional prior 
restraint of free speech.97 Justice Blackmun found in CBS that the economic 
harm that would allegedly result from a television broadcast of trade secrets 
did not justify a prior restraint on speech.98 Numerous other courts have also 
held that preliminary injunctions against public disclosure of trade secrets 
bear a heavy presumption against validity because of the First Amendment 
concerns.99  
 Another such interest is justice. For example, courts have recognized 
a privilege to disclose trade secrets for the purpose of revealing criminal 
fraud.100 Assorted state federal statutes and regulations privilege the 
disclosure of trade secrets to serve a variety of other public concerns, such 
as the environment,101 health and safety,102 and unmasking corporate 
wrongdoing through whistleblowing.103  
                                                
95 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii)(C); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 758. 
96 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1993) (“[D]isclosure of 
another’s trade secret for purposes other than commercial exploitation may implicate the 
interest in freedom of expression or advance another significant public interest. . . . The 
existence of a privilege to disclose another's trade secret depends upon the circumstances of 
the particular case, including the nature of the information, the purpose of the disclosure, 
and the means by which the actor acquired the information.”). 
97 510 U.S. 1315, 1316 (1994). In CBS, the Supreme Court stayed a preliminary injunction 
preventing a television station from broadcasting footage of allegedly proprietary meat 
packing processes in an exposé on the beef processing industry. Id. 
98 CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. at 1317-18. 
99 See Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and 
the First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 811 n.212 (2007). 
100 Re v. Horstmann, C.A. 83C-FE-82, 1987 WL 16710, at *1-2  (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 11, 
1987) (recognizing a privilege to disclose to law enforcement officials trade secrets 
relevant to criminal fraud that had been disclosed to the defendants in confidence, citing 
the former Restatement). 
101 Several states have passed statutes and regulations requiring companies engaging in 
hydraulic fracturing, a method of extracting natural gas, to provide information on the 
process to regulators, even when that information includes trade secrets. See, e.g., 2 COLO. 
CODE REGS. 404-1:205A(b)(2)(B); ARK. CODE R. 178.00.1-B-19(l)(8). Some states even 
require information that qualifies for trade secret protection be disclosed to the public. See, 
e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. 404-1:205A(d). 
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Finally, once a trade secret enters the public domain, whether 
legitimately or through misappropriation, it cannot be reclaimed.104 The 
secrecy requirement for trade secret protection ensures that no one wins 
protection for information already in the public domain. Relatedly, the 
requirement of reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy prevents the trade 
secret holder from allowing the information to flow to competitors at one 
time and then later suing them for trade secret misappropriation.105 In 
addition, if the information subject to trade secret protection is developed 
independently by a third party and becomes common knowledge, the 
information loses all trade secret protection.106  
II. CYBER-RISKS: CYBER-MISAPPROPRIATION AND POLITICAL 
REACTIONS 
A. The Cyber-Misappropriation Threat 
Numerous studies indicate that cyber-misappropriation of trade 
secrets is a serious and growing threat. First, economic and technological 
trends make misappropriation easier and more lucrative. Second, cyber-
hackers have become better financed and organized. This is particularly true 
of the hackers sponsored by nation states. China has made taking 
competitive information, particularly American competitive information, a 
matter of national policy. It appears that other countries have also entered 
this game. Unsurprisingly, the increasing sophistication of the hackers has 
led to more potent attacks, such as the insidious long-term cyber-intrusions 
known as advanced persistent threats. Finally, the available statistics on 
cyber-misappropriation, although deficient in many respects, suggest that 
cyber-misappropriation of trade secrets is increasing.  
A number of macro trends indicate that misappropriation of trade 
secrets, especially cyber-misappropriation will increase. From an economic 
                                                                                                                       
102 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); 75 Fed. Reg. 29754, 29756 (May 27, 2010) (stating the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation of the Toxic Substances Control Act that 
chemical identities must be included in health and safety studies made available to the 
public even if such information is a trade secret). 
103 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8) (West 1996 & Supp. 2006); N.Y. Lab. Law § 740 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2006). 
104 Baum v. Jones & Laughlin Supply Co., 233 F.2d 865, 870 (10th Cir. 1956) (holding that 
after a trade secret is publicly disclosed, there is no trade secret to give rise to a 
misappropriation claim). 
105 See UTSA § 1(4). 
106 See UTSA § 1(2); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (“A 
trade secret law, however, does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest 
means, such as by independent invention. . . .”). 
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perspective, companies rely heavily on increasingly valuable trade secrets 
for competitive advantage.107 In an increasingly information-based 
economy, companies must rely on trade secrets to protect their competitive 
advantage.108 This is vividly reflected in the increase in trade secret 
litigation. Trade secret litigation in federal court appears to have doubled 
between 1988 and 1995, and again between 1995 and 2004.109 Trade secret 
litigation in state courts has also grown at a steady rate.110 Given the high 
cost of trade secret litigation,111 these numbers suggest that trade secrets are 
increasingly important to companies. 
Cyber-misappropriation will likely make up an increasing share of 
trade secret misappropriation.112 Not only are trade secrets more accessible 
through computers, but cyber-misappropriation is also often an easier way 
to acquire data than through physical means. In the past, physically 
retrieving, removing, storing, and transferring documents involved a 
                                                
107 See generally David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets are Increasingly 
Important, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1104-1106 (2012) (providing seven reasons that 
trade secrets have become more important, including the increasing competitive need for 
trade secrets in a knowledge-based economy); Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or 
Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 71-72 (1999) (noting the “dramatically increased importance of 
trade secret law in the world of commerce,” and that “businesses and their legal advisors 
clearly believe that trade secret law matters”). 
108 See Catherine L. Fisk, Knowledge Work: New Metaphors for the New Economy, 80 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 839, 857 (2005) (“Virtually every observer from every possible 
perspective agrees that changes in the economy of industrial and postindustrial nations and 
the world as a whole have increased the importance of intellectual capital”); David S. 
Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets are Increasingly Important, 27 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1091, 1104-1106 (2012); see generally Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their 
Intellectual Property Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing 
Firms Patent (or Not) 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552 (finding that American firms most heavily 
rely on secrecy to protect product innovations). 
109 Federal Study, supra note 28, at 293. This study analyzed cases “in which a U.S. district 
court expressly decided a substantive issue based on trade secret law.” Id. at 298. As a 
result, it does not perfectly reflect all trade secret litigation in federal courts or trade secret 
litigation generally, much of which may result in settlements. 
110 State Study, supra note 26, at 68. 
111 Gilson, supra note 74, at 599; SHARON SANDEEN & ELIZABETH ROWE, TRADE SECRET 
LAW IN A NUTSHELL § 4.12.3 (West 2013); American Intellectual Property Law 
Association, 2013 Report of the Economic Survey (2013), 
http://www.patentinsurance.com/custdocs/2013AIPLA%20Survey.pdf.  
112 See Aaron J. Burstein, Trade Secrecy as an Instrument of National Security? Rethinking 
the Foundations of Economic Espionage, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 933, 944-46 (2009) (outlining 
the increasing concern in US government counterintelligence reports about cyber-
espionage).  
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significant logistical challenge.113 Now, as companies digitize their 
information, hundreds of thousands of documents can easily be stored on a 
CD or a flash drive.114 The information can then be sent anywhere there is 
internet access at the push of a button. The internet also broadens the field 
of possible misappropriators.115 Any computer system linked to the internet 
is vulnerable to hackers all over the world.116 Finally, the increase in cloud 
computing, mobile devices, and employees working from remote locations 
makes data available from many more points, often across national 
boundaries.117 
The Chinese government, and to a lesser degree, the Russian 
government, encourage and, in some cases, directly participate in the 
appropriation of other countries’ technologies and business information.118 
In the case of China, developing its technological capabilities is a key 
component of its plan to transform its economy.119 The latest form of this 
                                                
113 OFFICE OF THE NATL. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, FOREIGN SPIES STEALING US 
ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC 
COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE 2009-2011 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pd
f [hereinafter ONCIX 2011]. 
114 ONCIX 2011, supra note 113, at 2. 
115 See ERIC M. DOBRUSIN & RONALD A. KRASNOW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CULTURE: 
STRATEGIES TO FOSTER SUCCESSFUL PATENT AND TRADE SECRET PRACTICES IN 
EVERYDAY BUSINESS 234 (2008) (“With [new ideas and the internet] also grew the 
opportunity for misappropriation of the ideas and the technological means for achieving 
such misappropriations.”); ONCIX 2011, supra note 113, at 1-2. 
116 Id. at 1-2.  
117 ONCIX 2011, supra note 113, at 6-7; Cert 2013 Survey, supra note 46, at 1 (“Leaders 
are unknowingly increasing their digital attack vulnerabilities by adopting social 
collaboration, expanding the use of mobile devices, moving the storage of information to 
the cloud, digitizing sensitive information, moving to smart grid technologies, and 
embracing workforce mobility alternatives. . . .”); see also Sharon K. Sandeen, Lost in the 
Cloud: The Implications of Cloud Computing for Trade Secret Protection, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1685402 (Apr. 4, 2012). 
118 ONCIX 2011, supra note 113, at 5; THE COMMISSION ON THE THEFT OF AMERICAN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, THE IP COMMISSION REPORT 14-19 (May 2013), available at 
http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_052213.pdf [hereinafter IP 
COMMISSION REPORT]. 
119 IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 118, at 7 (technological industries); JAMES 
MCGREGOR, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CHINA’S DRIVE FOR ‘INDIGENOUS 
INNOVATION’—A WEB OF INDUSTRIAL POLICIES 17 (July 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/100728chinareport_0.pdf (“Premier 
Wen himself in December 2007 urged faster progress on the indigenous innovation 
program, saying that ‘in today’s world, science and technology is the ultimate deciding 
factor of a nation’s overall competitiveness, with indigenous innovation acting as the bones 
to support the rise of a nation.’”). 
21
Argento: Killing the Golden Goose
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 172 (2014)  2013-2014  
193 
strategy is the “indigenous innovation policy.”120 Ironically, the “indigenous 
innovation policy” espouses copying innovation from other countries, both 
openly, for example, by requiring that foreign companies disclose trade 
secrets as a condition for operating in China,121 and covertly, through 
sponsoring the cyber-misappropriation of trade secrets.122  
Cybersecurity experts had suspected for years that the Chinese 
government supported hacking into foreign organizations, especially 
American organizations, to obtain useful confidential information.123 In 
February 2013, the security company Mandiant provided the first 
convincing public evidence that the Chinese government directly sponsors 
the hacking of American companies to take trade secrets.124 Mandiant 
traced 141 cases of cyber-misappropriation—115 in the United States—to 
one unit of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Unit 61398.125 This unit 
was a substantial enterprise. Mandiant estimated that the work involved 
over 1,000 servers and dozens—perhaps hundreds—of staff, including 
linguists, malware authors, industry experts, and IT personnel.126 As 
Mandiant stated, “the most probable conclusion is that [this unit] is able to 
wage such a long-running and extensive cyber espionage campaign because 
it is acting with the full knowledge and cooperation of the government.”127  
The intrusions identified by Mandiant are not an isolated set of 
attacks. The Chinese government has likely provided support for many 
other instances of cyber-misappropriation.128 Indeed, Verizon estimated that 
of the 125 cases of confirmed breaches involving trade secret espionage that 
                                                
120 MCGREGOR, supra note 119, at 17.  
121 MCGREGOR, supra note 119, at 30.  
122 ONCIX 2011, supra note 113, at 5; IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 118, at 43; 
MANDIANT APT 1, supra note 1, at 2.  
123 See, e.g., U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2008 Report to 
Congress, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (2008) (“The Chinese government closely monitors 
Internet activities and is likely aware of the hackers’ activities.”); ONCIX 2011, supra note 
113, at 5, 7-8; MCAFEE, REVEALED: OPERATION SHADY RAT 6 (2011), AVAILABLE AT 
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf [hereinafter 
SHADY RAT]. 
124 MANDIANT APT 1, supra note 1, at 2. 
125 Id. at 3, 21. 
126 Id. at 5. 
127 Id. at 60. 
128 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012 Report to Congress: 
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it collected in 2013, 96 percent were attributable to Chinese state-affiliated 
actors.129 
Although Russia has not been linked as directly as China to specific 
cases of economic cyber-espionage, Russian leaders have explicitly stated 
that intelligence collection serves the goal of developing Russian science 
and technology for economic purposes.130 America arrested Russian spies 
allegedly tasked with collecting economic and technology information in 
2010, and there is evidence to suggest that Russia uses cyber means to 
collect such information.131  
International organized crime supplies another group of highly 
organized and well-financed hackers. The resources and organization of 
criminal gangs of course pale in comparison to the capabilities of the 
Chinese or Russian governments. Nevertheless, these criminal gangs are 
sometimes so large and well organized that they employ hundreds of 
people, including their own research and development departments.132 Up to 
this point, cyber-criminals have focused more on stealing credit card 
information and personal credentials, but studies find that they are now 
turning their attention to misappropriating trade secrets, too.133  
The combination of trade secret holders’ reliance on computer 
systems and the rise of the highly organized attackers just described appear 
to have combined to produce a dangerous new form of threat in the last few 
years—the advanced persistent threat (APT). The hackers engaged in APTs 
                                                
129 VERIZON 2013 REPORT, supra note 46, at 11 n.9, 21. Not all hacking by Chinese citizens 
is necessarily sponsored by the government. China has a widespread culture of hacking 
including many enterprises that openly provide hacking services. Edward Wong, Hackers 
Find China Is Land of Opportunity, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/world/asia/in-china-hacking-has-widespread-
acceptance.html.  
130 ONCIX 2011, supra note 113, at 6. 
131 ONCIX 2011, supra note 113, at 5, Annex B-2 (“Germany’s BfV notes that Russia uses 
[computer network exploitation] and e-mail interception to save billions of dollars on R&D 
in the energy, information technology, telecommunications, aerospace, and security 
sectors.”)  
132 MCAFEE, UNSECURED ECONOMIES: PROTECTING VITAL INFORMATION 15, 19 (Jan. 29, 
2009), available at 
http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/assets/pdf/mfe_unsec_econ_pr_rpt_fnl_online_012109.pdf  
[hereinafter MCAFEE UNSECURED ECONOMIES] (“According to Tim Shimeall of Carnegie 
Mellon University, the biggest source of threat in Russia is its mafia. ‘They have immense 
resources and proved to be ruthless. It is stated that eight percent of the world’s deposits is 
owned by them. With resources like that, the mafia can build its own communication 
infrastructure.’”). 
133 MCAFEE UNSECURED ECONOMIES, supra note 132, at 18. This may be particularly in the 
countries where companies have few scruples about taking proprietary information from 
competitors. Id. at 21.  
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breach the victims’ computer systems and stealthily monitor their activities 
over the course of months, even years.134 As a result, these intruders gain 
continuing access to trade secrets and other confidential information, a 
window into an organization’s secrets.135 APT attacks are highly 
sophisticated. They require constant monitoring and stealth from the 
attacker over a long period of time.136 In the cases identified by Mandiant, 
for example, Unit 61398 took trade secrets from organizations over a period 
of six years. The material it took included technology blueprints, 
proprietary manufacturing processes, test results, business plans, pricing 
documents, partnership agreements, emails, and contact lists.137  
Statistics in this area can be unreliable because organizations often 
do not know that they have been compromised.138 Even when they are 
aware of the compromise, they may not report it.139 In addition, the security 
companies that provide much of the statistics have a business incentive to 
report alarmingly large numbers on cyber-intrusion.140 The responses from 
companies themselves may be misleading because respondents may not 
know the precise definition of a trade secret. They may report that any 
information breached is a “trade secret.” Nevertheless, the available 
statistics suggest that the numbers are significant and increasing. For 
example, Verizon reported 120 cases of cyber-misappropriation in 2012.141 
In 2011, the Poneman Institute reported that the companies it surveyed 
experienced a stunning 1.4 successful attacks per company a week, and a 44 
                                                
134 SHADY RAT, supra note 123, at 2. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 MANDIANT APT 1, supra note 1, at 3. McAfee revealed another APT, which hacked and 
monitored 71 organizations for months and years. SHADY RAT, supra note 123, at 4, 9. 
138 VERIZON 2013 REPORT, supra note 46, at 10; SHADY RAT, supra note 123, at 1. 
139 VERIZON 2013 REPORT, supra note 46, at 10; ONCIX 2011, supra note 113, at i.  Even 
where reporting is required, organizations do not always comply. For example, cleared 
defense contractors are required by law to file reports of suspicious contacts indicative of 
foreign threats. Defense Security Service, Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend Analysis 
of Cleared Industry Reports 10 (2013), available at  
http://www.dss.mil/documents/ci/2013%20Unclass%20Targeting%20US%20Technologies
_FINAL.pdf. Only about ten percent of them, however, provide any sort of reporting. 
ONCIX 2011, supra note 113, at A-1. 
140 See Peter Maass & Megha Rajagopalan, Does Cybercrime Really Cost $1 Trillion?, 
ProPublica, Aug. 1, 2012, http://www.propublica.org/article/does-cybercrime-really-cost-
1-trillion (noting the observation of a cyber-security expert that security companies “have a 
vested interest in portraying a more dangerous environment because they stand to gain for 
it”).  
141 VERIZON 2013 REPORT, supra note 46, at 11 n.9, 18 fig. 8. 
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percent increase in cyber-attacks over the previous year.142 In another study, 
a full third of companies surveyed reported more cyber-attacks in 2013 than 
in 2012.143  
B. The Protectionist Response to the Cyber-Misappropriation 
Threat 
In response to the threat of cyber-misappropriation, trade secret 
holders and leaders across the political spectrum have pushed for more trade 
secret protections. Congress has already enacted several statutes bolstering 
protection. More federal legislation seems likely. Indeed, the media 
attention and florid rhetoric surrounding cyber-misappropriation may be 
creating the momentum for radical change to trade secret law. In particular, 
it seems increasingly probable that trade secrets will join the other major 
branches of intellectual property by gaining a private cause of action under 
federal law. Such a sweeping law has the potential to remake trade secret 
law, which has, up to this point, been governed chiefly by state law. If trade 
secret law were federalized by simply adding a private right of action to the 
Economic Espionage Act, as many have proposed, the new law would 
dramatically strengthen trade secret law in this country. 
1. The One-Sided and Inaccurate Rhetoric on Trade Secret 
Cyber-Misappropriation 
Politicians on both sides of the aisle have quickly recognized the 
political advantages of presenting themselves as tough on cyber-theft of 
trade secrets. The issue of cyber-misappropriation offers a potent mix of 
nationalism, property rights, moral outrage, and concerns about job security 
in already depressed economic times. The result has been one-sided, 
alarmist and often inaccurate rhetoric on the subject. The danger is that this 
rhetoric will lead to one-sided legislation that favors trade secret holders’ 
interests over all other interests. 
Apparently to emphasize the seriousness of the issue, political 
leaders have exaggerated the threat or relied on stunningly large but 
unverified numbers about the damage caused by cyber-hacking. Perhaps the 
                                                
142 PONEMON STUDY, supra note 2, at 1. These attacks included cyber-attacks other than 
cyber-misappropriation. Id. Cisco System’s report in 2011 shows similar numbers. Cisco 
Systems found a 46 percent increase in web malware during the first quarter of 2011 alone. 
CISCO SYSTEMS, CISCO 1Q11 GLOBAL THREAT REPORT 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/reports/cisco_global_threat_report_1
Q2011.pdf. 
143 CERT 2013 SURVEY, supra note 46, at 14. 
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best example of this exaggeration is the statement by the Director of the 
National Security Agency that cyberhacking has led to “the greatest transfer 
of wealth in history.”144 Members of Congress and the press have repeated 
General Alexander’s phrase ad nauseam and without question.145 
Nevertheless, the statement is absurd. One need only think of colonialism—
the exploitation of most of the world by a few countries—to imagine a 
greater transfer of wealth.146  
Public rhetoric on the subject also regularly employs eye-popping 
numbers on the level of cyber-hacking damage. General Alexander has 
claimed at different points that intellectual property theft costs Americans 
$250 billion or $300 billion per year.147 President Obama stated in a speech 
that cyber-criminals steal $1 trillion worth of intellectual property 
                                                
144 Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency, Keynote Address at 
American Enterprise Institute: Cybersecurity and American Power (July 9, 2012), available 
at http://www.aei.org/events/2012/07/09/cybersecurity-and-american-power/. 
145 See, e.g., Members of Congress: 159 CONG. REC. S3165-66 (daily ed. May 7, 2013) 
(statement of Sen. Carl Levin); Cyber Espionage and the Theft of U.S. Intellectual Property 
and Technology: Hearing Before the H. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 
113th Cong. (July 9, 2013) (statement of Rep. Tim Murphy), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/Heari
ngs/OI/20130709/HHRG-113-IF02-MState-M001151-20130709.pdf.  
Media: Emil Protalinski, NSA: Cybercrime is “the greatest transfer of wealth in history”, 
ZDNET, July 10, 2012, available at http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-cybercrime-is-the-greatest-
transfer-of-wealth-in-history-7000000598/; Chris Strohm & Nicole Gaouette, U.S. 
Downplays Spying Accusations in China Hacking Talks, BLOOMBERG NEWS, July 8, 2013, 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-08/spying-accusations-shadow-u-s-
china-cybersecurity-talks.html; Deborah Charles, Senators Propose Law to Combat Cyber 
Theft, NBC NEWS, May 7, 2013, available at 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/51809261/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/senators-
propose-law-combat-cyber-theft/. 
146 Spain alone transferred at least $20 billion of gold and silver in today’s dollars from the 
Americas to Spain before 1600. See Murdo J. Macleod, Spain and America: The Atlantic 
Trade, 1492-1720, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 341, 358-59, 365 
(Leslie Bethell ed., 1984). This calculation is based on estimates that Spain transferred at 
least 65 tons of gold and 25,000 tons of silver before 1600. See id. These numbers do not 
take into account the value of dyes, leathers, and other products, not to mention the 
transfers of valuable minerals in all the centuries following 1600. See id. at 358-67. 
147 Jim Garamone, Cybercom Chief Details Cyberspace Defense, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS 
SERVICE, Sep. 23, 2010, available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60987 ($300 billion); Gen. Keith B. 
Alexander, Director, National Security Agency, Keynote Address at American Enterprise 
Institute: Cybersecurity and American Power (July 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.aei.org/events/2012/07/09/cybersecurity-and-american-power/ ($250 billion). 
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annually.148 Members of Congress have repeated the $300 billion number 
many times, variously attributing it to intellectual property theft generally or 
to trade secret theft specifically.149  
In reality, there is little to no basis for these numbers.150 The $300 
billion number has been attributed to a report by ASIS International, but no 
ASIS International report appears to provide that number.151 The $300 
billion estimate may result from rounding up the $250 billion estimate of 
intellectual property losses annually for U.S. companies in the 1997 ASIS 
report.152 Alternatively, it may result from a miscalculation of numbers in 
                                                
148 Pres. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Securing Our Nation’s Infrastructure 
(May 29, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-
the-President-on-Securing-Our-Nations-Cyber-Infrastructure. 
149 See, e.g., Ryan Davis, China Worries Improve Prospects Of Trade Secrets Bill, LAW 
360 July 2, 2013, available at http://www.law360.com/articles/454818/china-worries-
improve-prospects-of-trade-secrets-bill (intellectual property); Chinese 
Telecommunications Investigation Open Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. 
on Intelligence, 112th Cong. (Sept. 13, 2012) (statement of Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger), 
available at 
http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/09122012Dutch
Opening.pdf (trade secrets); Cyber Espionage and the Theft of U.S. Intellectual Property 
and Technology Before the H. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 113th Cong. 
(July 9, 2013) (statement of Rep. Tim Murphy), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/Heari
ngs/OI/20130709/HHRG-113-IF02-MState-M001151-20130709.pdf (intellectual 
property); Cyber Espionage and the Theft of U.S. Intellectual Property and Technology 
Before the H. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 113th Cong. (July 9, 2013) 
(statement of Rep. Fred Upton), available at  
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/Heari
ngs/OI/20130709/HHRG-113-IF02-MState-U000031-20130709.pdf (intellectual property).  
150 For a full discussion of the problems with these statistics, see Peter Maass and Megha 
Rajagopalan, Does Cybercrime Really Cost $1 Trillion?, ProPublica, Aug. 1, 2012, 
available at http://www.propublica.org/article/does-cybercrime-really-cost-1-trillion 
(noting the observation of a cyber-security expert that security companies “have a vested 
interest in portraying a more dangerous environment because they stand to gain for it.”) 
151 For examples of other reports attributing the $300 billion estimation to an ASIS 
International report, see Ruth M. Corbin, Managing Risk and Protecting Intellectual 
Property, IVEY BUSINESS JOURNAL, January/February 2002, available at 
http://iveybusinessjournal.com/topics/the-organization/managing-risk-and-protecting-
intellectual-property; OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, 
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL 
ESPIONAGE—2002, 1-2 (2002), available at 
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/fecie_2002.pdf. Despite a review of the 
ASIS International reports and the help of information specialists at ASIS International’s 
O.P. Norton Information Resources Center, the author could not find an ASIS International 
report that expressly contained the $300 billion estimate. 
152 See, e.g., ASIS INTERNATIONAL, 1997 TRENDS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LOSS 
SURVEY REPORT 2 (1998).  
27
Argento: Killing the Golden Goose
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 172 (2014)  2013-2014  
199 
the 1998 ASIS report.153 ASIS reports, however, like many other reports on 
this subject, themselves admit that estimations on intellectual property loss 
are unreliable, and have refrained from calculating new estimates in later 
reports.154 As a chief economist at the Government Accountability Office’s 
Applied Research and Methods division stated, “we don’t find any basis for 
believing [$300 billion] to be an accurate number.”155 
The truth is that calculating losses from the trade secret theft is very 
difficult.156 A number of researchers have attempted to do so, and have 
produced wildly differing estimations.157 One of the problems is that there 
is no clear market value for a given trade secret.158 The reason for this is 
                                                
153 ASIS calculated that Fortune 1000 companies lost $45 billion worth of proprietary 
information in a 17-month period. ASIS INTERNATIONAL, 1998 TRENDS IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LOSS SURVEY REPORT 29 (1999). Forty-five billion dollars in losses over a 17-
month period would equate to about $32 billion in losses on an annual basis. The 1998 
ASIS report stated that it had a 10 percent response rate, so multiplying $32 billion by ten 
would produce a number close to $300 billion. Id. However, the $45 billion estimate was 
already produced by extrapolating the response rate across the rest of the Fortune 1000. Id. 
at 25. As a result, multiplying $32 billion by ten is a miscalculation by an order of 
magnitude. 
154 See, e.g., ASIS FOUNDATION, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS 26 (2002); 
ASIS INTERNATIONAL, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS 3 (June 2007), 
available at https://www.asisonline.org/ASIS-Store/Products/Pages/Trends-in-Proprietary-
Information-Loss.aspx [hereinafter ASIS 2007 SURVEY]; IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra 
note 118, at 23; CERT 2013 SURVEY, supra note 46, at 3.  
155 Natasha Dhillon, Witnesses, Lawmakers at House Hearing On IP Theft, Cyber 
Espionage Take Aim at China, BNA Snapshot, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, July 9, 
2013.   
156 IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 118, at 23; JAMES ANDREW LEWIS & STEWART 
BAKER, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
CYBERCRIME AND CYBER ESPIONAGE 16 (July 2013), available at  
http://csis.org/publication/economic-impact-cybercrime-and-cyber-espionage [hereinafter 
CSIS REPORT] (“[A] precise single figure for the cost of cyber crime and cyber espionage 
is unattainable . . . .”); OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, 
FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE—2003 2 (2003), available 
at http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/fecie_2003/fecie_2003.pdf (“The 
Counterintelligence (CI) Community cannot accurately establish the dollar cost to the 
nation of the loss of trade secrets, but we believe the flow has eroded the US global 
military and economic advantage.”). 
157 Estimates from academic literature on the losses from economic espionage range so 
widely as to be meaningless—from $2 billion to $400 billion or more a year—reflecting 
the scarcity of data and the variety of methods used to calculate losses. See ONCIX 2011, 
supra note 113, at 4; CSIS REPORT, supra note 156, at 6. 
158 Even the market value fails to indicate the amount of the loss because the infringer 
likely would not have purchased the information if it were available for sale. Moohr, supra 
note 53, at 900-01 (“The estimates of lost value are often based on an assumption that 
infringers would have purchased the object if it was not otherwise available, and there is no 
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simple: trade secrets are secret and not sold on an open market.159 Without a 
readily identifiable market value, researchers are often thrown back on the 
biased estimates of the companies themselves.160  
Of course, the fact that the amount of harm caused by cyber-
misappropriation is hard to ascertain does not prove that the threat is 
negligible. As discussed in Part II.A, infra, there are many reasons to be 
worried about cyber-misappropriation. But politicians’ willingness to 
espouse these unverifiable numbers indicates their interest in provoking 
public concern—and likely their hope to reap the political benefits of taking 
action on trade secret theft. 
Moreover, politicians’ acceptance of these numbers suggests a basic 
misconception about trade secrets—or at least a readiness to engage in 
misleading rhetoric on the subject. The misconception is that the taking of a 
trade secret results in an absolute loss of that information to the trade secret 
holder. The reality is more complicated. President Obama’s claim in a 
speech that a “single employee of an American company was convicted of 
stealing intellectual property reportedly worth $400 million” illustrates the 
problem.161 The statement implies that the company suffered $400 million 
in losses. In fact, this particular company, DuPont, apparently lost nothing. 
The government prosecutors admitted that there was no evidence that any of 
the information that the employee had copied was transferred to a third 
party.162  
But even if the employee had conveyed DuPont’s trade secrets to a 
competitor, it is highly unlikely that the damages to DuPont would amount 
to $400 million. As discussed above, the market for trade secrets is difficult 
to determine. Trade secret losses are hard to calculate for another basic 
reason. Because trade secrets are information, they are typically not stolen 
in the sense that the thief obtains the item and the victim loses it. Instead, as 
                                                                                                                       
evidence that this is the case.”); State Study, supra note 26, at 292 (“There is little data on 
the exact value of trade secrets because trade secrets are, by definition, secret.”). 
159 State Study, supra note 26, at 292.   
160 For example, in United States v. Min, DuPont valued the trade secrets taken by the 
defendant at $400 million. Memorandum of Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Min, No. 
1:06-cr-00121-SLR (D. Del. Nov. 13, 2006). However, DuPont did not suffer $400 million 
in damages. See Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Downward Departure 
at 7-8, United States v. Min, No. 1:06-cr-00121-SLR (D. Del. Nov. 5, 2007). 
161 Pres. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Securing Our Nation’s Infrastructure 
(May 29, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-
the-President-on-Securing-Our-Nations-Cyber-Infrastructure.  
162  Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Downward Departure at 7-8, 
United States v. Min, No. 1:06-cr-00121-SLR (D. Del. Nov. 5, 2007). 
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in the DuPont case, trade secret misappropriators copy the information.163 
Thus, the loss to the trade secret holder is not the loss of the information; it 
is instead the loss of the competitive advantage the information provided 
with regard to the party that obtained the information.164 Depending on how 
well the new possessor takes advantage of that information and how directly 
it competes with the initial trade secret holder, the victim may suffer heavy 
losses, or none at all.165 Where the victim does not know the identity of the 
misappropriator, as is often the case in cyber-misappropriation, the loss can 
be almost impossible to determine with accuracy.166 
The language of the debate on trade secrets not only simplifies and 
exaggerates damages, it conflates the taking of trade secrets with “theft,” 
“stealing,” and “robbery,” appropriating the emotional and moral 
connotations of these terms.167 For example, Senator Carl Levin fumed, “[i]t 
is outrageous that American trade secrets are being stolen,”168 and 
Representative Mike Rogers stated dramatically that China is “robbing U.S. 
ingenuity and innovation.”169 But, as the Supreme Court observed, 
interference with intellectual property “does not easily equate to theft.”170 
                                                
163 Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Downward Departure at 4-5, United 
States v. Min, No. 1:06-cr-00121-SLR (D. Del. Nov. 5, 2007).  
164 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3; Moohr, supra note 53, at 918; see generally CSIS 
REPORT, supra note 156. 
165 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3; see, e.g., University Computing Co. v. Likes-
Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 536 (5th Cir. 1974) (identifying the plaintiff’s lost 
profits and the “benefits, profits, and advantages gained by the defendant in the use of the 
trade secret” as potential measure of damages); In re Jonatzke, 47 B.R. 846 (Bkrtcy. E.D. 
Mich. 2012) (identifying lost profits, erosion of market share, and out-of-pocket expenses 
as possible measures of damages). 
166 IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 118, at 40. For a discussion of how difficult it can 
be to estimate losses due to another kind of intellectual property rights infringement—
copyright infringement—see Julian Sanchez, 750,000 Lost Jobs? The Dodgy Digits Behind 
the War on Piracy, ARS TECHNICA, Oct. 7, 2008, available at http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2008/10/dodgy-digits-behind-the-war-on-piracy. 
167 See, e.g., Eamon Javers, White House Mobilizes to Stop Theft of Trade Secrets, CNBC, 
(Feb. 21, 2013, 3:55 PM), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/100481542 (“The Obama 
administration is mobilizing the full force of the federal government in an effort to stop 
theft of trade secrets from American companies.”). 
168 159 CONG. REC. S3165-66 (daily ed. May 7, 2013) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). 
169 Press Release, U.S Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 
Financial & Contracting Oversight Subcommittee, Bipartisan Effort to Punish Nation-State 
Cyber Hackers (June 6, 2013), available at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/fco/media/ranking-member-johnson-joins-
bipartisan-effort-to-punish-nation-state-cyber-hackers. 
170 Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216-17 (1985). The Supreme Court was 
discussing copyright, but the same observations apply to trade secrets. See id. A trade 
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The simple binary formulation in personal property law that any 
unauthorized taking is a theft and therefore morally wrongful does not apply 
in trade secret law. Instead, trade secret law countenances many ways in 
which trade secrets may be acquired without authorization—reverse 
engineering, accidental disclosure, and so on—because the dissemination of 
useful information serves the public interest.171 Referring to trade secret 
misappropriation as theft simplifies misappropriation into black and white 
moral terms. Those who take information held by another become 
“thieves,” regardless of whether the information meets the specific criteria 
of a trade secret or qualifies as misappropriation.172 This rhetoric no doubt 
appeals to deeply rooted American notions on the sanctity of property, but it 
does not accurately reflect the risks to trade secrets.173  
Of course, no one expects politicians to discuss legal issues with 
perfect precision. But the rhetoric displays a one-sided focus on information 
holder’s interests, according them an apparently unlimited right to 
information as their property. This language disregards the policy concerns 
favoring public access to information. More fundamentally, it discounts the 
basic rationale underlying trade secret law: trade secret rights are intended 
to serve the public interest, not trade secret holders specifically.174  
Public discussion of cyber-misappropriation also plays on the 
public’s fears by linking the issue to job loss and threats to national 
security. Again, these concerns are real, but they present a one-sided and 
emotional picture of the cyber-misappropriation problem.  
Political leaders emphasize repeatedly that trade secret theft 
threatens American jobs. Senator John McCain, for example, stated that 
cyber-espionage “kills American jobs.”175 In this area too, the rhetoric relies 
on massive, unverified numbers, such as Congressman Tim Murphy’s claim 
that the theft of intellectual property “translates into roughly 2.1 million lost 
                                                                                                                       
secret also “comprises . . . [a] delimited interest[] to which the [common] law affords 
correspondingly exact protections.” See id. at 216. 
171 See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. 
172 See, e.g., 159 CONG. REC. S3165-66 (daily ed. May 7, 2013) (statement of Sen. Carl 
Levin). 
173 See, e.g., JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 4 (University of Chicago Press, 1990) (arguing that a concern with 
private property rights shapes American institutions, its political system, and its conception 
of limited government). 
174 See supra Part I.B. 
175 Press Release, Office of U.S. Senator Carl Levin, Bipartisan Group of Senators 
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jobs.”176 As a recent report observed, such numbers are highly uncertain.177 
Nevertheless, threats to jobs are an emotionally resonant issue for the 
public, especially in the current economy of persistently high 
unemployment.178 
Finally, the rhetoric tends to subsume risks to trade secrets into risks 
to national security.179 Some trade secrets directly implicate national 
security, such as secrets related to military contractors.  Political leaders 
have tended to emphasize this connection by highlighting instances in 
which cyber-hackers have taken information about military technology 
from defense contractors.180 But cyber-crime losses inflicted on defense 
contractors appear to comprise only a fraction of cyber-crime losses 
overall.181 
Members of Congress and the Obama Administration have not just 
linked the limited instances of trade secret misappropriation from defense 
contractors to national security concerns. They have conflated economic 
                                                
176 Cyber Espionage and the Theft of U.S. Intellectual Property and Technology Before the 
H. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 113th Cong. (July 9, 2013) (statement of 
Tim Murphy, H. Rep.), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/Heari
ngs/OI/20130709/HHRG-113-IF02-MState-M001151-20130709.pdf. 
177 CSIS REPORT, supra note 156, at 17. 
178 See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, Databases, Tables & 
Calculators By Subject, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (data extracted Nov. 13, 
2013), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000  
179 For example, Senator Ron Johnson declared: “Theft of U.S. intellectual property . . . 
costs American jobs, innovation, and threatens national security.” Press Release, U.S. 
Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, Fin. & Contracting Oversight 
Subcomm., Bipartisan Effort to Punish Nation-State Cyber Hackers (June 6, 2013), 
available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/fco/media/ranking-member-
johnson-joins-bipartisan-effort-to-punish-nation-state-cyber-hackers; see also Fahmida Y. 
Rashid, U.S. Senators Introduce ‘Deter Cyber Theft Act’ to Help Protect Trade Secrets, 
SECURITYWEEK, May 9, 2013, available at http://www.securityweek.com/us-senators-
introduce-deter-cyber-theft-act-help-protect-trade-secrets; Press Release, Office of U.S. 
Senator Carl Levin, Bipartisan Group of Senators Introduces Legislation to Combat Cyber 
Theft (May 7, 2013), available at 
http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/bipartisan-group-of-senators-
introduces-legislation-to-combat-cyber-theft (Cyber-espionage “kills American jobs, 
undermines the competitiveness of our businesses and compromises U.S. economic and 
national security interests, and it must stop now.”).  
180 For example, in introducing the Deter Cyber Theft Act, Senator Levin gave the example 
of cyber-espionage against QinetiQ, a defense contractor, that “jeopardized the [victim] 
company’s sensitive technology involving drones, satellites, the U.S. Army’s combat 
helicopter fleet, and military robotics.” 159 CONG. REC. S3165-66 (daily ed. May 7, 2013) 
(statement of Sen. Carl Levin).  
181 PONEMON STUDY, supra note 2, at 11. 
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harm caused by taking any business secret with harm to national security.182 
The House Report on the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act 
illustrates the conflation of economic and national security risks:  
Perhaps most troubling, these [efforts by advanced nation-
state actors to penetrate American computer systems and 
networks] are targeted not only at sensitive national security 
and infrastructure information, but are also often aimed at 
stealing the corporate research and development information 
that forms the very lifeblood of the American economy. . . . 
There can be no question that in today’s modern world, 
economic security is national security. . . .183 
 This reasoning makes little sense from a policy perspective. First, it 
disregards any meaningful limit on national security risks. If economic loss 
is the measure of a national security risk, traffic congestion is a national 
security risk.184  
 Second, the policy goals in the two areas are in tension with each 
other.185 Trade secret law protects information as a means for providing 
incentives to invent and to exchange information.186 In contrast, the goal of 
protecting information for national security reasons is to prevent disclosures 
that would harm national interests.187 As a result, trade secret holders and 
the government will not always act in ways that serve each other’s interests. 
For example, trade secret misappropriation by a foreign actor has no effect 
on a trade secret holder’s economic interest if that actor does not compete in 
the same market. As a result, a trade secret holder may not enforce its rights 
against the foreign actor even if the loss of the trade secret harms national 
                                                
182 H. REP. NO. 113-039 at 9 (2013). This reasoning goes back at least to the passage of the 
EEA when the House Report stated: “There can be no question that the development of 
proprietary economic information is an integral part of America’s economic well-being. 
Moreover, the nation’s economic interests are a part of its national security interests. Thus, 
threats to the nation’s economic interest are threats to the nation’s vital security interests.” 
H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4023. 
183 H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4023. 
184 Burstein, supra note 112, at 947. 
185 See id. at 963-68. 
186 See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 
1991). The other chief rationale for trade secret law—enforcing standards of commercial 
morality—is also in tension with national security concerns. See Burstein, supra note 112, 
at 966-69. 
187 Burstein, supra note 112, at 965.  
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security.188 Conversely, from a national security perspective, trade secret 
misappropriation among American companies is not worth pursuing, 
because it causes little harm to national interests.  
 Thus, it seems that the principal benefit from classifying trade secret 
cyber-misappropriation as a national security threat is to increase the public 
sense of urgency with respect to protecting trade secrets. Stronger trade 
secret protections will seem imperative if risks to trade secrets threaten our 
national security.  
 It is unclear whether politicians act from ignorance or political 
expediency in disregarding countervailing policy concerns. Ignorance may 
be the reason. Compared to other areas of intellectual property law, trade 
secrets have received little attention on a federal level. Trade secrets, unlike 
patent, copyright, and trademark, are primarily governed by state law, not 
federal law.189 From a common familiarity point of view, politicians, like 
the public, may be less familiar with trade secret information simply 
because such information is secret. In contrast, the average person 
encounters material protected by copyright, trademark, or patent law on a 
daily basis.190 In any case, it may not matter why members of Congress and 
the Obama administration discuss trade secret law in one-sided terms based 
on lack of knowledge or political opportunism. Whatever the reason, the 
result is that they promote policies heavily weighted toward trade secret 
holders’ rights. 
2. Strengthening Trade Secret Rights through Federal Law 
The combination of cyber-risks and protectionism may lead to a 
radical strengthening of trade secret law. Congress has already enacted 
statutes increasing trade secret protection under criminal law. The logical 
next step is to strengthen civil trade secret law through a federal law. A 
federal civil trade secret law could provide advantages over the current state 
                                                
188 As the ONCIX 2011 report observed, U.S. private industry representatives cared little 
about whether their information was collected by foreign intelligence services or by 
criminals, although collection by the former has greater impact on national security. 
ONCIX 2011, supra note 113, at 1-2. 
189 See supra Part I.A. and infra note 205 and accompanying text. Although Congress 
passed the EEA, it has not been a high profile law. Since its passage in 1996, there have 
been only around one hundred indictments and a handful of convictions. Peter J. Toren, An 
Analysis of Economic Espionage Act Prosecutions: What Companies Can Learn From It 
and What the Government Should Be Doing About It!, 84 BNA PATENT, TRADEMARK, & 
COPYRIGHT J. 884, 2 (2012). 
190 An average American citizen listens to copyright-protected music or sees a trademark 
every day. To a lesser extent, Americans may be familiar with the label “patented” or 
“patent pending” on ordinary products.  
34
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 16 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol16/iss1/5
 KILLING THE GOLDEN GOOSE 
206 
system, but it need not grant stronger rights to trade secret holders than state 
law to provide the advantages of federalization. Nevertheless, due to 
Congress’s one-sided concern with protecting trade secrets, any federal civil 
trade secret law enacted now is likely to grant much stronger rights to trade 
secret holders than existing state law. 
In 2012, Congress upped the penalties for violating the EEA and 
broadened its reach to apply to a broader range of interstate activity.191 
More legislation appears likely. The Obama administration is now 
conducting a legislative review to determine if additional legislation is 
needed to enhance enforcement against trade secret theft.192 Meanwhile, a 
number of bills have been proposed or are now pending in Congress to 
provide additional protection to trade secret holders.193  
One obvious legislative change would be to create a private party 
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation under federal law. Some 
commentators on trade secret law have advocated a federal civil trade secret 
law for years.194 Now, however, due to concerns about cybersecurity, 
                                                
191 The Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-236 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2013)); The Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement 
Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-269 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a)-(b) (2013)).  
192 OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON 
MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 12 (Feb. 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on_mitigating_th
e_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY].   
193 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014, S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014); Future of American 
Innovation and Research Act of 2013, S. 1770, 113th Cong. (2013); Private Right of 
Action Against Theft of Trade Secrets Act of 2013, H.R. 2466, 113th Cong. (2013); 
Protecting American Trade Secrets and Innovation Act of 2012, S. 3389, 112th Cong. 
(2012); Cyber Economic Espionage Accountability Act, S. 1111, 113th Cong. (2013); 
Cyber Economic Espionage Accountability Act, H.R. 2281, 113th Cong. (2013); Deter 
Cyber Theft Act, S. 884, 113th Cong. (2013). 
194 See Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 427 (1995); Moohr, supra note 53, at 920; R. Mark Halligan, Protection of U.S. 
Trade Secret Assets: Critical Amendments to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 7 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 656, 668 (2008) (proposing amending the EEA to add a 
private civil cause of action without preempting state law); see David S. Almeling, Four 
Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 769, 773 (2009) [hereinafter Four Reasons]; Lao, supra note 23, at 1667. No 
commentator appears to offer a robust defense of the state law system. The American 
Intellectual Property Law Association wrote a report in 2004 concluding that the benefits 
of a federal civil trade secret were outweighed by the costs: the additional burden on 
federal courts and the loss of state control over the regulation of their economies. Report of 
the Trade Secrets Committee, American Intellectual Property Law Association, (2004), 
available at 
http://www.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/Trade_Secret_Law/Pages/default.aspx. 
However, the AIPLA appears to have changed its mind, at least in part, because it 
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advocacy for federalizing trade secret law has intensified. Four bills in 
Congress propose federalizing civil trade secret law.195 And more than half 
of the parties that responded to the Obama administration’s request for 
public comments on legislation to combat foreign trade secret theft 
specifically recommended a federal civil trade secret law.196 More recently, 
the IP Commission, a bipartisan commission on the theft of American 
intellectual property, advocated a federal civil trade secret law in May 
2013.197  
                                                                                                                       
recommended a private party cause of action against foreign misappropriation under 
federal law to IPEC. See Jeffrey Lewis, Response to Request for Public Comments for 
“Trade Secret Theft Strategy Legislative Review” (78 Fed. Reg. 16875, March 19, 2013), 




195 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014, S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014); Future of American 
Innovation and Research Act of 2013, S. 1770, 113th Cong. (2013); Private Right of 
Action Against Theft of Trade Secrets Act of 2013, H.R. 2466, 113th Cong. (2013); 
Protecting American Trade Secrets and Innovation Act of 2012, S. 3389, 112th Cong. 
(2012). 
196 IPEC specifically invited “the public to submit recommendations for legislative changes 
to enhance enforcement against, or reduce the risk of, trade secret theft for the benefit of 
foreign companies or foreign governments.” U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement 
Coordinator Request for Public Comments, Docket ID: OMB-2013-0002, FR Doc. 2013-
06226, filed Mar. 18, 2013, available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2013-0002-0001. Parties calling 
for a general federal civil cause of action included the Intellectual Property Owner’s 
Association and the Alliance for Clean Technology Innovation. Intellectual Property 
Owner’s Association, Request for Public Comments on “Trade Secret Theft Strategy 
Legislative Review” 78 Fed. Reg. 16875 (Mar. 19, 2013), at 1, Apr. 22, 2013, available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2013-0002-0001; Alliance for 
Clean Technology Innovation, Response to the Request of the U.S. Intellectual Property 
Enforcement Coordinator for Public Comments: Legislative Review Related to 
Enforcement Against Economic Espionage and Trade Secret Theft, at 8, Apr. 22, 2013, 
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2013-0002-0001. 
Others, including the American Intellectual Property Law Association and Intel 
Corporation called for a private party cause of action under federal law only against foreign 
trade secret misappropriation.  See Jeffrey Lewis, Response to Request for Public 
Comments for “Trade Secret Theft Strategy Legislative Review” (78 Fed. Reg. 16875, 




Intel Corp., IPEC Request for Comments on Trade Secret Theft Strategy Legislative 
Review, at Pt. III, Apr. 22, 2013, available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2013-0002-0001. 
197 IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 118, at 5. 
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 Trade secret law is now the only one of the four major branches of 
intellectual property law lacking a federal private party cause of action.198 
Congress could do so under its Commerce Clause power, in the same way 
that the federal trademark law and the EEA are enacted under Congress’s 
power to regulate interstate commerce.199  
Ever since the UTSA was adopted, there has been a law review 
article written every decade or so that advocates for a civil cause of action 
under federal law.200 The EEA has not satisfied this demand, since it is only 
a criminal federal trade secret law.201 A civil federal trade secret law, 
according to advocates, could decrease both transactional and enforcement 
costs for many trade secret holders by improving uniformity in trade secret 
law across the country.202  
Although all but two states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act (UTSA) in some form,203 almost every state has adopted a slightly 
different version.204 As a result, supporters of a civil federal trade secret law 
                                                
198 Four Reasons, supra note 194, at 771. 
199 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (“‘commerce’ means all commerce 
which may lawfully be regulated by Congress”); 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (limiting protection 
to trade secrets “used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce”). 
200 For more complete discussions of the arguments in favor, see generally Almeling, Four 
Reasons, supra note 194; Lao, supra note 23; Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a 
Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427 (1995). 
201 With the exception of the provision for civil claims by the Attorney General, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1836(a). The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), which provides both criminal and 
civil remedies, may be a stronger contender as a federal trade secret law. Courts have 
interpreted the CFAA to create liability for the cyber-misappropriation of trade secrets. See, 
e.g., Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 
1126-27 (W.D. Wash. 2000); George S. May Int’l Co. v. Hostetler, No. 04 C 1606, 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9740, at *10 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2004) (finding that infringement of 
copyrighted material taken from a computer qualifies as impairment of integrity of data 
under the CFAA).  Courts, however, have split on this point. Some courts have held that 
misappropriation of trade secrets alone fails to satisfy the damage and loss provisions of the 
CFAA. See Consulting Prof’l Res., Inc. v. Concise Techs., LLC, No. 09-1201, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 32573, at *22 (concluding that a “compromise or decrease in the competitive 
value of . . . confidential information does not satisfy the [CFAA’s] damage requirement”); 
see also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-cv-1580-Orl-31KRS, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 53108, at *26 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006) (holding that taking confidential 
information is not damage under the CFAA). 
202 See Four Reasons, supra note 194, at 770; Lao, supra note 23, at 1636; Christopher 
Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 442 
(1995). 
203 See Lao, supra note 23. 
204 States vary on what constitutes misappropriation, the definition of a trade secret, the 
length of injunctions, exemplary damages, attorney fees, and the statute of limitations. Lao, 
supra note 23, at 1661-65; see also Linda B. Samuels & Bryan K. Johnson, The Uniform 
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argue that companies that operate across state lines must invest time and 
money to investigate the different rules in each state in which it operates.205 
They contend that enforcement costs are higher, too, because of the time 
involved in researching the specific laws of each state in which the 
misappropriation occurred and litigating choice-of-law issues.206 They 
conclude that a uniform federal law would decrease these costs.207 
This argument may be overstated. Although the statutes differ in 
some details, state courts typically agree on the core principles of trade 
secret law.208 To the extent that trade secret law varies between states, 
however, growth in cyber-misappropriation bolsters the argument for a 
federal civil trade secret law. Due to the fact that cyber-hackers may 
misappropriate data from wherever they have internet access, the defendants 
                                                                                                                       
Trade Secrets Act: The States’ Response, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 49, 51 52 (1990); Four 
Reasons, supra note 194, at 779-82. For example, by setting a high standard for 
misappropriation, Alabama’s trade secret law provides considerably less trade secret 
protection than the UTSA. See Long, The Alabama Trade Secrets Act, 18 CUMB. L. REV. 
557, 567 (1988). Under the Alabama statute, misappropriation requires that the defendant 
take the trade secret embodied in physical form with intent to use the trade secret in a trade 
or business. Ala. Code § 8-27-2(1) (1993); Lao, supra note 23, at 1662, 1678. The UTSA’s 
definition of misappropriation requires neither that the trade secret be embodied in physical 
form nor that the defendant intend to use the trade secret in a trade or business. See UNIF. 
TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433, 438 (1985). Conversely, North Carolina 
version of the UTSA sets a much higher standard for misappropriation than the UTSA, 
thereby providing more protection for trade secret holders. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-152(1) 
(1997); Lao, supra note 23, at 1663. 
205 See Four Reasons, supra note 194, at 779-82. 
206 The court must determine what law applies to a legal dispute whenever the dispute 
implicates the substantive law of more than one state. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 
235, 254 (1958). This is a different question than personal jurisdiction. See id. A court may 
have personal jurisdiction over a defendant yet still be obliged to apply the law of a 
different state. See id.; see also Federal Study, supra note 28, at 312. 
207 Four Reasons, supra note 194, at 776-78; Lao, supra note 23, at 1673. Of course, 
federal laws are interpreted differently in different circuits, but at least courts would be 
starting from the same statutory language. The Supreme Court also steps in occasionally to 
resolve circuit splits. U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 10(a) (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court may 
review a case on a writ of certiorari where “a United States court of appeals has entered a 
decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same 
important matter”); Supreme Court Procedures: Writs of Certiorari, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/get-informed/supreme-court/supreme-
court-procedures.aspx (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court only accepts 100-150 of the 
more than 7,000 cases that it is asked to review each year). 
208 See JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 2.03[7](c) (2013) (“It is true that the similarities 
in substance among state enactments are far greater than the differences in language used”) 
Even where the language of the law differs, courts’ interpretations are similar. See id. at § 
2.01[1] (“Usually what is seen as ‘improper means’ in Illinois will be similarly seen in 
California. . . .”). 
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in cases of cyber-misappropriation are more likely to reside in a different 
state or even a different country than traditional defendants.209 Further, 
determining where the wrong occurred may be quite difficult in the digital 
context when the defendant committed the wrong while located in one state, 
yet the actual cyber-intrusion took place on computer servers in another 
state. 210 As a result, choice-of-law issues become quite complicated in 
cyber-misappropriation cases, thereby significantly increasing the cost of 
litigation.211 A civil federal law would obviate the choice-of-law problem. 
In addition, suing out-of-state and out-of-country defendants is 
easier in federal court because of liberal discovery rules and broader 
jurisdictional reach. Unlike in federal courts, trial counsel do not have 
access to nationwide subpoenas in most state courts.212 To give an example 
of the discovery challenges, a plaintiff in an Illinois court cannot depose a 
witness in California without petitioning both the Illinois and California 
courts.213 Therefore, for jurisdictional and procedural reasons, direct access 
to federal courts through subject-matter jurisdiction under a federal civil 
trade secret law might facilitate suits against cyber-misappropriators.214   
This would only be true, however, in a very limited number of cases 
because parties in cyber-misappropriation cases would generally have 
access to federal courts anyway. Because cyber-misappropriators are likely 
to be out-of-state defendants, plaintiffs can assert these claims in federal 
courts under their diversity jurisdiction.215 The parties would also have 
access to federal courts through supplemental subject-matter jurisdiction 
due to the fact that cyber-misappropriation cases often involve federal 
claims under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as well other federal 
laws.216 
                                                
209 See ERIC M. DOBRUSIN & RONALD A. KRASNOW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CULTURE: 
STRATEGIES TO FOSTER SUCCESSFUL PATENT AND TRADE SECRET PRACTICES IN 
EVERYDAY BUSINESS 234 (2008) (“With [new ideas and the Internet] also grew the 
opportunity for misappropriation of the ideas and the technological means for achieving 
such misappropriations.”). 
210 See Lao, supra note 23, at 1668-74. 
211 See supra note 206. 
212 R. Mark Halligan, Protection of U.S. Trade Secret Assets: Critical Amendments to the 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 656, 667-68 
(2008).  
213 Id. at 668. 
214 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
215 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). This is true as long as the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 
Id. If the losses through cyber-espionage are as great as advocates of strengthening trade 
secret law claim, then plaintiffs should not have difficulty alleging damages in this amount.  
216 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006) (defining the civil procedure mechanism of supplemental 
jurisdiction).  
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In addition, a civil federal trade secret law would pose new hurdles 
to trade secret owners. Due to the fact that such a law would be enacted 
under Congress’s Commerce Clause power, trade secret holders would have 
to show use of the trade secret in interstate commerce as a threshold 
matter.217 Being forced to prove use in interstate commerce early in the 
litigation would increase the risk that the trade secret would be disclosed to 
the public.218 To lessen this risk, trade secret owners might prefer to pursue 
their trade secret claims under state law.  
To summarize, it is possible that in some cases, a federal law might 
overcome inefficiencies in the state law system. But that does not mean that 
a federal law must grant broader rights to trade secret holders. Given the 
desire among political leaders to take action on cyber-misappropriation, this 
may be a dangerous time for Congress to enact a federal civil trade secret 
law. As shown in the preceding subsection, political leaders appear to be 
deeply concerned about cyber-misappropriation of trade secrets – or, at 
least, they find it politically advantageous to appear tough on cyber trade 
secret theft. Consequently, countervailing concerns may get short shrift in 
the deliberations.  
Indeed, the most likely version of a federal civil trade secret law 
illustrates precisely this danger. The easiest route to federalizing trade secret 
law would be to add a private right of action to the Economic Espionage 
Act (EEA). The EEA is a federal criminal statute with two main 
provisions.219 The foreign espionage provision prohibits the 
misappropriation of trade secrets to benefit foreign governments.220 The 
more general trade secret provision codified in Section 1832 of Title 18 
prohibits trade secrets misappropriation generally, in terms roughly similar 
to the UTSA.221 Amending the EEA to allow private parties to sue for 
violations of Section 1832 would effectively create a federal civil trade 
secret law. 
                                                
217 See supra note 206; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (“‘commerce’ means 
all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress”);18 U.S.C. § 1832 (limiting 
protection to trade secrets “used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce”); 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998) (rejecting doctrine of 
“hypothetical jurisdiction” that would allow a court to rule on issues of law before 
adjudicating jurisdiction). 
218 SHARON SANDEEN & ELIZABETH ROWE, TRADE SECRET LAW IN A NUTSHELL § 4.10 
(West 2013). 
219 The EEA does provide for civil claims by the Attorney General, but not by private 
parties. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836. 
220 18 U.S.C. § 1831. 
221 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831, 1832, 1839; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1. 
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The additional language necessary to add a private right of action to 
the EEA would raise few drafting disputes because it would require no 
more than a sentence.222 Tacking onto the EEA rather than creating a new 
statute would have the advantage of using language from a statute that has 
existed without major controversy for almost two decades.223 The idea also 
has considerable support.  
Advocates have called for a private right of action under the EEA 
since the act was enacted in 1996.224 Like calls for a federal civil trade 
secret law generally, calls for adding a private claim to the EEA have 
multiplied in response to rising concern about cyber-threats. Practicing 
attorneys, the bipartisan commission on intellectual property law, and 
numerous other organizations have all recommended giving private parties 
the right to sue for violations of the EEA.225 Two years ago, Senators Kohl, 
Coons, and Whitehouse sponsored the Protecting American Trade Secrets 
and Innovation Act of 2012 (PATSIA), which would have granted private 
parties the right to sue for violations of the existing EEA, ex parte seizure 
orders, and a federal version of the UTSA.226 In June 2013, Representative 
                                                
222 For example, a bill proposed by Rep. Zoe Lofgren adds a single sentence providing a 
private right of action to the EEA. See Private Right of Action Against Theft of Trade 
Secrets Act of 2013, H.R. 2466, 113th Cong. (2013).  
223 The EEA was enacted in 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-294, Oct. 11, 1996. 
224 As Sen. Arlen Specter stated, “We have been made aware that available civil remedies 
may not be adequate to the task and that a federal civil cause of action is needed. This is an 
issue we need to study carefully, and will do so next year.” 104 Cong. Rec. S12201, 
S12208 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996). The EEA already includes a civil cause of action in that 
the Attorney General may obtain an injunction for violation of the EEA. 18 U.S.C. § 1836. 
The EEA, however, currently has no provision for suits by private parties. See 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1831-1836. 
225 IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 118, at 5; R. Mark Halligan, Protection of U.S. 
Trade Secret Assets: Critical Amendments to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 7 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 656, 678 (2008); Intellectual Property Owner’s 
Association, Request for Public Comments on “Trade Secret Theft Strategy Legislative 
Review” 78 Fed. Reg. 16875 (Mar. 19, 2013), at 1, Apr. 22, 2013 available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2013-0002-0001; 
Peter Toren, Trade Secret Theft Strategy Legislative Review, available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2013-0002-0001; Russell Beck, 
Response to Request for Public Comments for Trade Secret Theft Strategy Legislative 
Review (78 Fed. Reg. 16875, Mar. 19, 2013) Docket number IPEC-2013-0002, Apr. 22, 
2013, available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2013-0002-
0001. 
226 Protecting American Trade Secrets and Innovation Act of 2012, S. 3389, 112th Cong. 
(2012). 
41
Argento: Killing the Golden Goose
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 172 (2014)  2013-2014  
213 
Zoe Lofgren introduced a bill that added a private right of action to the 
EEA.227 Other similar bills are pending.228 
III. THE COSTS OUTWEIGH THE BENEFITS OF STRENGTHENING TRADE 
SECRET LAW TO COMBAT CYBER-MISAPPROPRIATION 
At first blush, the logic of enacting stronger trade secret laws to 
counter cyber-misappropriation makes sense. If the goal of the property 
theory of trade secret law is to balance incentives to develop useful 
information against public access, then trade secret law should strengthen 
trade secret protections to counter cyber-misappropriation. Otherwise, it 
would seem that the increased vulnerability of trade secrets to cyber-threats 
will result in decreased incentive to develop trade secrets. Logically, trade 
secret holders will invest less in developing useful information if that 
information can be easily cyber-misappropriated and used by 
competitors.229 To protect the economy and innovation then, the law should 
strengthen trade secret rights.  
But in fact, broadly strengthening trade secret laws will likely harm 
innovation and the economy with little compensating benefit.  
First, trade secret holders will benefit little from increased rights to 
pursue cyber-misappropriation in the courts. Despite the evidence of 
growing misappropriation of business information through cyber-hacking, 
cases involving cyber-misappropriation constitute only a small percentage 
of overall trade secret cases in the courts. It may be that the litigation 
statistics do not reflect the percentage of cyber-misappropriation that 
actually occurs. However, trade secret holders are reluctant to pursue cyber-
misappropriators in court for a number of reasons unrelated to trade secret 
law. As a result, greater rights and protections are unlikely to encourage 
trade secret holders to enforce their rights more vigorously in the courts. 
Second, a law to increase rights and protections for all trade secret 
holders would dramatically tip the balance of trade secret law against public 
access. Follow-on development of the trade secret information would suffer, 
as well as other public interests in trade secret information.  
                                                
227 Private Right of Action Against Theft of Trade Secrets Act of 2013, H.R. 2466, 113th 
Cong. (2013). Notably, Representative Lofgren’s bill excludes reverse engineering and 
independent derivation from misappropriation. See id. 
228 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014, S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014); Future of American 
Innovation and Research Act of 2013, S. 1770, 113th Cong. (2013). 
229 Similarly under the tort theory, if increased vulnerability to cyber-misappropriation 
leads trade secret holders to wasteful expenditures on security, then the law should provide 
greater protection to trade secrets. See Part I.A, supra, for a discussion of the tort theory of 
trade secret law. 
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A. Strengthening Trade Secret Law Would Have Little Effect on 
Cyber-Misappropriation 
 As this section will explain, granting trade secret holders stronger 
legal rights will do little to help them protect their trade secrets. First, trade 
secret holders often refrain from suing cyber-misappropriators for reasons 
related to technical and strategic concerns, not to weaknesses in the law. 
Second, although a federal civil trade secrets law may offer trade secret 
holders some procedural advantages in suits against cyber-
misappropriation, cyber-misappropriation does not pose unique substantive 
challenges. To the contrary, establishing a substantive claim of trade secret 
misappropriation based on cyber-hacking is relatively straightforward.  
1. Trade Secret Holders Have Technological and Business 
Reasons for not Suing Cyber-Misappropriators 
Trade secret holders are unlikely to sue cyber-misappropriators for a 
number of non-legal reasons: failure to detect the misappropriation, 
inability to identify the perpetrator, embarrassment, concern about 
disclosing the trade secret, business diplomacy, and convenience.  
In many cases of trade secret misappropriation by cyber-hacking, 
the victim may not even realize it has been hacked.230 Even where it is 
aware of the intrusion, the firm may not be able to identify whom to sue. 
The internet makes it relatively easy for cyber-hackers to hide their 
identities.231 Cyber-intruders often route their operations through other 
computer systems to hide the origin of their activity.232 And cyber-hackers 
increasingly share tools across the internet, making it hard to identify a 
group by its tactics.233 Foreign entities even hire independent hackers to do 
their work for them, providing plausible deniability.234 As a result, even 
sophisticated cyber-security companies struggle to identify the culprits 
behind cyber-intrusions.235 Indeed, Mandiant made headlines when it 
                                                
230 ONCIX 2011, supra note 113, at 3; ONCIX, ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN 
ECON. COLLECTION & INDUS. ESPIONAGE v (2005); OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTER 
INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL 
ESPIONAGE—2003 at 2 (2003), available at 
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/fecie_2003/fecie_2003.pdf.  




235 See, e.g., MANDIANT, THE ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREAT, M-TRENDS 2 (2010), 
available at https://www.mandiant.com/resources/m-trends/ [hereinafter M-TRENDS 2010] 
(cyber-security firm admitting to inability to determine the identities of advanced persistent 
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managed to identify one advanced persistent threat as a unit of the Chinese 
army.236 Although attribution techniques will likely improve, so will the 
evasion tactics of cyber-intruders.237 In the meantime, many individual 
companies will not have the time or resources to find the perpetrator. 
Determining whether an insider has misappropriated data is 
easier.238 The insider typically has an assigned identifier. The company can 
simply check the computer system logs to determine what information he or 
she accessed.239  
Even where trade secret holders know they have been compromised 
and can identify the culprit, they hesitate to pursue cyber-misappropriators 
because of unwillingness to publicly disclose that they have been 
compromised.240 Companies generally have no obligation to report cyber-
intrusions to law enforcement or intelligence agencies.241 Except for the 
limited case of activists, the parties that misappropriated the trade secret try 
to keep their actions secret because of concerns about legal liability and a 
desire to maintain the competitive advantage of the trade secret.242 As a 
result, information about the trade secret loss will generally not become 
                                                                                                                       
threats); SHADY RAT, supra note 123, at 4, 6 (cyber-security unable to identify cyber-
intruder despites gaining access to the culprit’s command and control server and 
identifying 71 of the compromised parties). 
236 See David E. Sanger, et al., China’s Army Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-
seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html. 
237 See generally MANDIANT APT 1, supra note 1.  
238 CERT 2013 SURVEY, supra note 46, at 11 (discussing the tools available to companies to 
detect insider attacks).  
239 For example, in United States v. Min, the discovery by the employer’s IT department 
that the defendant employee had accessed an unusual number of documents within a few 
days triggered an investigation that led to criminal charges. Government’s Response to 
Defendant’s Motion for Downward Departure at 5, United States v. Min, No. 1:06-cr-
00121-SLR (D. Del. Nov. 5, 2007). 
240 COMPUTER SECURITY INSTITUTE, 2010/2011 COMPUTER CRIME AND SECURITY SURVEY 
24 (2011), available at http://www.ncxgroup.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/CSIsurvey2010.pdf (reporting that breached organizations did not 
report breaches to law enforcement because of concerns about negative publicity); OFFICE 
OF THE NATIONAL COUNTER INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION 
AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE—2003 at 2 (2003), available at 
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/fecie_2003/fecie_2003.pdf  
241 See generally SAMUELSON LAW, TECH. & PUB. POLICY CLINIC, UNIV. OF CAL. AT 
BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, Security Breach Notification Laws: Views from Chief Security 
Officers (2007) (discussing public notification laws and their effect on the information 
security industry), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/cso_study.pdf. 
242 In some cases, however, confidential information is misappropriated by posting it on the 
internet for public disclosure. Elizabeth A. Rowe, Proposing a Mechanism for Removing 
Trade Secrets from the Internet, 12 NO. 3 J. INTERNET L. *3 (2008). 
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public unless the trade secret holder files suit or otherwise publicizes the 
matter. Trade secret holders, however, face several disincentives against 
disclosure. 
In general, firms are reluctant to disclose trade secret losses because 
of concerns about the effect on their stock price,243 losing control of the 
investigation to the government prosecutors,244 and further dissemination of 
the trade secret.245 The loss of trade secrets through cyber-intrusion raises 
additional concerns about loss of public reputation and trust.246 A trade 
secret theft by an insider who exploits access necessary for her job does not 
necessarily suggest incompetence. Organizations must give their insiders 
access to trade secrets in order to use them, and occasionally a firm employs 
a bad apple.247 However, a cyber-intrusion by an outsider suggests that all 
data stored in the organizations’ computer systems are vulnerable to cyber-
attacks from around the world. This raises concerns among customers and 
the public at large that the organization cannot protect consumer privacy, 
credit card information, financial information, or any other data which 
members of the public have entrusted to the organization.248 For example, a 
                                                
243 See Chris Carr & Larry Gorman, The Revictimization of Companies by the Stock Market 
Who Report Trade Secret Theft Under the Economic Espionage Act, 57 BUS. LAW. 25, 52 
(2001). 
244 Corporate and Industrial Espionage and Their Effects on American Competitiveness: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Pol’y & Trade of the H. Comm. on Int’l 
Relations, 106th Cong. 180 (2000) (statement of Scott Charney, Partner, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers). 
245 See Economic Espionage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 7, 94 (1996) (statement of Thomas W. Brunner, Partner, Wiley, 
Rein & Fielding); see generally Gerald O’Hara, Cyber-Espionage: A Growing Threat to 
the American Economy, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 241, 271 (2010). 
246 For example, a survey of chief information security officers conducted by the 
Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic at University of California-Berkeley 
School of Law found that all respondents were concerned that a public notification of a 
breach would damage their organizations’ reputations and the trust behind their name. See 
SAMUELSON LAW, TECH. & PUB. POLICY CLINIC, supra note 241 at 15.   
247 See Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 435 (Pa. 1960) (“[I]t must be recognized that 
modern economic growth and development has pushed the business venture beyond the 
size of the one-man firm, forcing the businessman to a much greater degree to entrust 
confidential business information relating to technological development to appropriate 
employees.”). 
248 See SAMUELSON LAW, TECH. & PUB. POLICY CLINIC, supra note 241 at 14-15. For 
example, a CSI/FBI survey found that 48 percent of respondents cited negative publicity as 
a reason for not reporting a computer security breach to law enforcement. Id. See also Paul 
M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 913, 929 (2007) (“Companies sometimes invest in data security because they care 
about the regard in which they are held by outsiders, whether consumers, citizens, 
communities, or social activists. . . . Today, fear of unauthorized access to such information 
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survey showed that over three-quarters of marketing professionals believed 
that security breaches negatively impacted the reputations of companies.249  
In addition, trade secret owners fear that their trade secrets will be 
disclosed during the litigation process.250 Although courts may agree to 
issue protective orders during the pleading and discovery stages, trade 
secrets can still leak through these protections.251 At the trial stage, courts 
hesitate to restrict public access to court proceedings because of the strong 
public interest in open access to judicial proceedings.252 
Firms may also hesitate to pursue cyber-misappropriation for 
reasons of business diplomacy. Publicly accusing a foreign government or 
corporate rival of trade secret misappropriation could alienate potential 
business partners and offend potential customers.253 Moreover, the 
advantages of doing business in a profitable market may outweigh the costs 
of some trade secret losses.254   
Finally, the loss of trade secrets through cyber-misappropriation 
may often be a low priority for trade secret holders. Again, 
misappropriation of a trade secret usually does not deprive a firm of the 
information itself.255 The loss to the firm is the loss of the competitive 
                                                                                                                       
and the possibility of identity theft would add another level of concern.”); ONCIX 2011, 
supra note 113, at 3 (“[A]nnouncing a security breach of this kind could tarnish a 
company’s reputation and endanger its relationships with investors, bankers, suppliers, 
customers, and other stakeholders.”);   
U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, 112TH CONG., ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 10 (2012), available at  
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2012-Report-to-Congress-
Executive%20Summary.pdf.  
249 CMO COUNCIL, Secure the Trust of Your Brand: How Security and IT Integrity 
Influence Corporate Reputation, 7 (2006). 
250 SHARON SANDEEN & ELIZABETH ROWE, TRADE SECRET LAW IN A NUTSHELL § 4.10 
(West 2013). 
251 Id. at § 4.10.1. 
252 See, e.g., Citizens First Nat. Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945 
(7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he public at large pays for the courts and therefore has an interest in 
what goes on at all stages of a judicial proceeding. . . . That interest does not always trump 
the property and privacy interests of the litigants, but it can be overridden only if the latter 
interests predominate in the particular case, that is, only if there is good cause for sealing a 
part or the whole of the record in that case.”). 
253 ONCIX 2011, supra note 113, at 3 (“Second, identifying IP theft almost necessarily 
requires identifying the source of the theft. If the origin of the theft is in a strategically 
important market for a company, then a certain level of theft may be written off as merely a 
‘cost of doing business’ in an otherwise profitable market.”); IP COMMISSION REPORT, 
supra note 118, at 23. 
254 IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 118, at 23. 
255 CSIS REPORT, supra note 156, at 8 (“[C]yber spying is not a zero-sum game. Stolen 
information is not really gone. Spies can take a company’s product plans, its research 
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advantage that the trade secret provided.256 By definition, a firm loses no 
competitive advantage when companies use its trade secret in a market in 
which it does not compete.257 Although the media and the political 
establishment loudly deplore cyber-misappropriation from afar by foreign 
actors—especially foreign governments—this type of misappropriation may 
not concern companies without operations in these foreign countries.258 In 
addition, developing a piece of complicated technology requires expertise 
and know-how that a trade secret misappropriator may lack.259 Even if the 
companies that receive the trade secrets use that information to eventually 
compete, the initial trade secret holder may by that point rely on new 
innovations for a competitive advantage.260 As a result, firms may decide 
that pursuing the loss of trade secrets to non-competitors or even potential 
competitors operating in remote markets is not worth the effort. 
2. Strengthening Substantive Trade Secret Law Would Have 
Little Impact on Cyber-Misappropriation  
From a legal perspective, however, suits against cyber-
misappropriators do not pose greater substantive challenges than 
conventional trade secret cases. To the contrary, cases involving outside 
hacking may be easier to assert than cases involving insiders. 
To prove trade secret misappropriation under the UTSA, a plaintiff 
must prove: 1) the information at issue derives independent economic value 
from not being generally known or readily ascertainable by competitors; 2) 
the information at issue was subject to reasonable efforts to keep it secret; 
and 3) misappropriation.261 Of these, the latter two elements will be 
relatively easy to prove in cases involving outside cyber-hackers. The first 
element will involve the same challenges as in any other trade secret case. 
Hacking into a database to obtain trade secrets easily satisfies the 
misappropriation element of a trade secret claim.262 Again, state trade secret 
                                                                                                                       
results, and its customer lists today, and the company will still have them tomorrow. The 
company may not even know that it no longer has control over that information.”). 
256 Id. at 9.  
257 Burstein, supra note 112, at 947. 
258 Id. 
259 CSIS REPORT, supra note 156, at 9 (“[Acquirers] may lack the advanced  
manufacturing capacity or skill needed to produce military or high tech products.”). 
260 See CSIS REPORT, supra note 156, at 9 (noting that putting a competing product on the 
market containing misappropriated trade secrets may take years). 
261 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1.   
262 Improper means include illegal conduct, E.I. DuPont De Nemours v. Christopher, 431 
F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1970) and a number of independent laws, including the CFAA, 
prohibit hacking. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (“Whoever intentionally accesses 
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laws modeled on the UTSA effectively divide misappropriation into two 
types: improper means and breach of a confidence.263 The UTSA explicitly 
states that “espionage through electronic means” is a form of improper 
means.264 “[E]spionage through electronic means” rather clearly refers to 
hacking computer systems to obtain access to trade secrets and courts have 
adopted that interpretation.265  
With regard to the second requirement, if the computer system could 
only be breached by some form of unauthorized and sophisticated cyber-
hacking, then the computer system itself would not fail the requirement of 
reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.266 The trade secret holder might fail 
to satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement in other ways—for example, by 
failing to sign non-disclosure agreements with business partners—but these 
measures are not specific to cases involving misappropriation through a 
computer system. As a result, proving misappropriation of a trade secret in 
a case involving cyber-misappropriation does not involve additional legal 
challenges specific to cyber-misappropriation.  
To the contrary, the features inherent to cyber-misappropriation 
make a claim of trade secret misappropriation relatively easy to prove. 
Because a trade secret holder can satisfy the misappropriation element by 
showing espionage through electronic means, the trade secret holder need 
not undertake the more complicated task of proving a breach of a 
confidence or one of the other more complex types of misappropriation.267 
                                                                                                                       
a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains 
information from any protected computer . . . shall be punished . . . .”); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 502(c). There may be gray areas at the boundaries concerning, for example, whether 
hacking in some instances constitutes permissible reverse engineering. See GABRIEL M. 
RAMSEY ET AL., 2 INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE § 18:19 (2013). Most scenarios involving 
hacking are, however, indisputably a form of improper means.   
263 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2). 
264 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1(1), (2). 
265 See, e.g., Physicians Interactive v. Lathian Systems, Inc., 2003 WL 23018270, *8 (E.D. 
Va. 2003) (“There can be no doubt that the use of a computer software robot to hack into a 
computer system and to take or copy proprietary information is an improper means to 
obtain a trade secret, and thus is misappropriation under the VUTSA.”); see also Four 
Seasons Hotels and Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1326 
(S.D. Fla. 2003) (finding that hacking into a computer system constitutes misappropriation 
by espionage through electronic means). 
266 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i). 
267 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii)(B)(II) (“‘Misappropriation’ means . . . disclosure 
or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who . . . 
at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade 
secret was . . . acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or 
limit its use . . . .”); E.I. DuPont De Nemours v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016-17 (5th 
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Those advocating stronger trade secret laws might object that trade 
secret law should be strengthened not to combat outside cyber-
misappropriators, but rather to counter insiders who take advantage of the 
digitization of trade secrets to easily collect and transfer massive amounts of 
information, sometimes across the globe. Many of the cases in which trade 
secrets were transferred to foreign countries involved employees using their 
access to the internet and the employer’s digitized trade secrets to send trade 
secrets outside of the United States.268 But again, these are relatively 
straightforward trade secret misappropriation cases under the UTSA. When 
an insider sends thousands of documents by using her insider access, it is 
relatively easy to show that she understood the value of those documents 
and her duty to maintain secrecy.269  
3. Statistical Evidence that Strengthening Trade Secret Law 
Would Have Little Effect on Cyber-Misappropriation  
Litigation and breach statistics support the conclusion that 
strengthening trade secret law would have little impact on cyber-
misappropriation. Trade secret holders in fact seem to be reluctant to sue in 
cases of cyber-misappropriation. The statistics suggest that the number of 
cyber-misappropriation cases that plaintiffs bring to court is significantly 
smaller than the number of actual incidents of trade secret cyber-
misappropriation.  
Three studies indicate that cases of cyber-misappropriation are a 
small percentage of the total number of litigated trade secret cases. 
Attorneys at O’Melveny & Myers LLP conducted two studies: a study on 
state trade secret cases and one on federal trade cases.270 In both, the 
attorneys examined all opinions that expressly decided a substantive trade 
                                                                                                                       
Cir. 1970) (holding that calculated efforts to overcome reasonable efforts to maintain 
secrecy are improper means). 
268 See, e.g., ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY, supra note 192, at 5, 7; Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Press Release, Former DuPont Chemist Sentenced to 14 Months in Prison for 
Stealing DuPont Trade Secrets, (Oct. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/baltimore/press-releases/2010/ba102110a.htm (defendant emailed trade 
secrets to his email account created for his new job at a Chinese university); United States 
v. Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“On his last day of employment 
at Goldman, June 5, 2009, Aleynikov copied, compressed, encrypted, and transferred to an 
outside server in Germany hundreds of thousands of lines of source code for the Trading 
System, including trading algorithms that determine the value of stock options.”).  
269 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1.  
270 State Study, supra note 26; Federal Study, supra note 28. 
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secret law issue.271 The federal study examined cases between 1950 and 
2008, for a total of 394 cases.272 The state study looked at cases between 
1995 and 2009, resulting in 358 cases.273 Of the state trade secret cases, 93 
percent involved an insider, either an employee or a business partner.274 The 
percentage was 85 percent in the federal cases.275 Peter Toren’s study of 
cases under the Economic Espionage Act echoes these numbers.276 Toren 
reviewed all 124 prosecutions conducted by the government between the 
law’s enactment in 1996 and 2012.277 He found that in more than 90 percent 
of cases, the defendant was an insider, either an employee or business 
partner.278 International numbers tell a similar story. For example, 
Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution reported 
that approximately 70 percent of all German cases involved insiders.279 
Although these studies did not track precisely how many cases 
involved cyber-misappropriation, the data about insiders and outsiders 
indicate that cyber-misappropriation is rarely litigated.280 Much of the 
concern about cyber-misappropriation has centered on reports of outsiders, 
particularly foreigners, hacking into companies to misappropriate trade 
secrets.281 At the outside, these cases can only constitute about 7-15 percent 
                                                
271 The federal study analyzed opinions from federal district courts. Federal Study, supra 
note 28, at 293. The state study focused instead on state appellate decisions because state 
trial court opinions are often unpublished or lacking in detail. State Study, supra note 26, at 
63. While the two data sets are not perfect parallels since the federal study examines trial 
court opinions and the state study examines appeals opinions, there is no obvious reason to 
think that insider cases are appealed more often than outsider cases, or vice versa. As a 
result, the data from the studies seems at least roughly comparable. 
272 Federal Study, supra note 28, at 293. 
273 State Study, supra note 26, at 59. 
274 State Study, supra note 26, at 69. 
275 Federal Study, supra note 28, at 303. 
276 Peter J. Toren, An Analysis of Economic Act Prosecutions: What Companies Can Learn 
From it and What the Government Should Be Doing About It!, BLOOMBERG BNA PATENT, 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT JOURNAL, 5 (Vol. 84, No. 2081) (Sep. 21, 2012). 
277 Id. at 1. 
278 Id. at 5. The correspondence between O’Melveny’s federal study and Toren’s study is 
not surprising considering that O’Melveny included EEA cases in its study, but it is a 
useful validation of each study’s accuracy. Federal Study, supra note 28, at 297, 330. 
279 ONCIX 2011, supra note 113, at App. B. 
280 Toren, supra note 276, at 5; Federal Study, supra note 26, at 303-04 (“The data show 
that [concerns about misappropriation by foreign actors] may be overblown because 
unrelated third parties comprise a small percentage of alleged misappropriators.”). 
281 See, e.g., David E. Sanger, et al., Chinese Army Unit Is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-
army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html. 
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of litigated cases.282 Indeed, the percentage is probably less because not all 
outsider cases may involve cyber-misappropriation.283 Second, the insider 
cases—the vast majority of cases—involve little cyber-hacking. Insiders 
need not resort to cyber-hacking because they already have access.284 As 
studies of insider misappropriation show, most cases of misappropriation by 
insiders simply involve employees or business partners taking advantage of 
the access available to them as part of their jobs.285 
Statistics from other sources, however, suggest that cyber-hackers 
cause more breaches than the litigation statistics show.286 This tends to 
confirm that trade secret holders refrain from suing in cases of cyber-
misappropriation.  
The relevant studies fall into two categories: company surveys and 
collected incident reports. With regard to the former, at least a third of 
surveyed companies consistently cite outsider attacks as the greatest source 
of risk to their proprietary information. In a 2009 survey by McAfee, for 
example, 51 percent of respondents cited cyber-vulnerabilities as the 
biggest threat to their vital information.287 Similarly, a 2013 CERT report 
found that 31 percent of respondents identified external attacks as causing 
the most damage to their company.288 Perhaps more concretely, about 30 
                                                
282 Toren, supra note 276, at 5; State Study, supra note 26, at 69; Federal Study, supra note 
28, at 303. 
283 ASIS INTERNATIONAL, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS 28 (June 2007), 
available at 
https://foundation.asisonline.org/FoundationResearch/Publications/Documents/trendsinpro
prietaryinformationloss.pdf [hereinafter ASIS 2007 SURVEY]. Survey respondents only 
reported 16 threats to proprietary information by outsiders involving either electronic 
interception or penetration. Id. at 34 (noting that only 33 percent of incidents it surveyed 
involved records in electronic format).  
284 Verizon reported that most cases of insider data breach involve insiders misusing their 
privileges. VERIZON 2013 REPORT, supra note 46, at 6; CERT 2013 SURVEY, supra note 46, 
at 10. 
285 VERIZON 2013 REPORT, supra note 46, at 6; CERT 2013 SURVEY, supra note 46, at 10. 
286 See CERT 2013 SURVEY, supra note 46, at 3 (survey); MCAFEE UNSECURED 
ECONOMIES, supra note 132, at 2 (survey); VERIZON 2013 REPORT, supra note 46, at 8-10 
(collected incident report).  
287 MCAFEE, UNSECURED ECONOMIES: PROTECTING VITAL INFORMATION 9 (Jan. 29, 2009) 
available at 
http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/assets/pdf/mfe_unsec_econ_pr_rpt_fnl_online_012109.pdf  
[hereinafter MCAFEE UNSECURED ECONOMIES]. 
288 CERT 2013 SURVEY, supra note 46, at 10. The CERT Study surveyed over 500 US 
executives, security experts, and others from the public and private sectors. Id. at 3. The 
CERT survey may not be as relevant to trade secret misappropriation because it asked more 
generally about damage from “electronic crime,” which might encompass a range of crimes 
other than trade secret misappropriation, such as destructive viruses, privacy breaches, and 
theft of financial information. Id. at 10.  
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percent of the respondents in a 2007 ASIS Foundation study stated that 
outsiders caused their single most significant incident of loss.289  
The most detailed public report collecting incidents of breaches, 
Verizon’s 2013 Data Breach Investigations Report, tells a more startling 
story about outsider breaches than the surveys. Based on 125 incidents of 
data breaches involving trade secret compromises, Verizon found that 96 
percent involved external actors and only 4 percent involved insiders.290 
Methodological differences between Verizon’s report and the survey 
reports, however, suggest that the truth is somewhere in between. Unlike 
the surveys, Verizon analyzed confirmed breaches.291 Breached 
organizations generally supplied this information to Verizon in the course 
of investigations into the nature, extent, and possible remediation of the 
breach.292 As a result, the information is skewed toward outsider cyber-
hacking because organizations typically have less need for forensic services 
in cases of insider breach. In cases of insider breach, the breached 
organization generally already knows how the insider got access and the 
extent of that access because the organization itself gave the permissions.293 
It bears noting at this point that insider misappropriation still 
appears to make up the lion’s share of trade secret misappropriation. In the 
2009 survey by McAfee and 2007 survey by the ASIS Foundation, 68 
percent and 67 percent, respectively, of respondents reported that insiders 
constituted the greatest threat to vital information.294 Indeed, an analyst at 
                                                
289 ASIS 2007 SURVEY, supra note 283, at 33. One hundred and forty-four companies, 
representing a diverse array of businesses, responded to the ASIS Survey in 2006, although 
less than that number responded to this specific question. Id. at 6, 33. This question 
specifically asked about the single-most-significant successful attempt to compromise or 
gain unauthorized access to each respondent’s proprietary and trade secret information 
during 2005. Id. at 6. 
290 VERIZON 2013 REPORT, supra note 46, at 19, fig. 10. Additional analysis conducted on 
raw data supplied by Verizon is on file with the author.  
291 VERIZON 2013 REPORT, supra note 46, at 4. 
292 About 10 percent of the breaches were reported directly to Verizon by the organization 
experiencing the breach, usually in the course of receiving forensic services from Verizon’s 
forensic consulting practice. The rest of the data came from a range of other 
organizations—including law enforcement agencies, incident handling entities, and other 
forensic service firms—most of which also obtained the information in the course of 
investigations. Interview with Wade Baker, Verizon, Verizon RISK Team (July 5, 2013) 
(Mr. Baker participated in compiling the report); VERIZON 2013 REPORT, supra note 46, at 
4. 
293 Interview with Wade Baker, supra note 292; VERIZON 2013 REPORT, supra note 46, at 4 
294 MCAFEE UNSECURED ECONOMIES, supra note 287, at 9; ASIS 2007 SURVEY, supra note 
283, at 33. In the ASIS survey, this question specifically asked about the single-most 
significant successful attempt to compromise or gain unauthorized access to the 
respondent’s organization’s proprietary and trade secret information during 2005. Id. at 6. 
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the technology consulting firm Gartner estimated employees accounted for 
about 70 percent of computer system intrusions that resulted in a loss.295 
The 2013 CERT survey found that a greater number of respondents 
identified insider crimes (34 percent) as causing more damage to an 
organization than external attacks (31 percent).296 Insider attacks appear to 
be more damaging than outsider attacks because insiders know better what 
information is valuable and how to find it.297 Therefore, even if trade secret 
holders for some reason began to pursue cyber-misappropriation more 
vigorously, a large number of cases would still involve insider 
misappropriation. 
In short, bolstering trade rights would likely have little effect on 
cyber-misappropriation. But, as the next section discusses, it would affect 
other forms of trade secret misappropriation. 
B. Costs of Strengthening Trade Secret Law by Adding a Private 
Right of Action to the EEA 
Due to the fact that cyber-misappropriation poses no unique 
substantive legal challenges, strengthening trade secret law will not 
facilitate suits against cyber-misappropriation specifically. Instead, trade 
secret holders would simply find pursuing trade secret misappropriation 
easier in all cases. However, tipping the balance of trade secret law in favor 
of trade secret holders generally will harm other interests at stake in trade 
secret law without the compensating effect of targeting cyber-
misappropriation.  
                                                                                                                       
The McAfee survey involved IT professionals from more than 1,000 organizations in U.S., 
U.K., Japan, China, India, Brazil and the Middle East. MCAFEE UNSECURED ECONOMIES, 
supra note 287, at 2, 5. 68 percent of the respondents cited “insider threat” as the top threat 
to vital information. Id. at 9. 
295 Bob Tedeschi, Crime is Soaring in Cyberspace, But Many Companies Keep it Quiet, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/27/business/e-commerce-
report-crime-soaring-cyberspace-but-many-companies-keep-it-quiet.html. 
296 CERT 2013 SURVEY, supra note 46, at 9-10 (“While most of the media cybercrime 
reporting has been on remote network attacks over the Internet, survey results show 
that among respondents answering insider-related questions, insiders were deemed more 
likely to be the sources of cyberattacks.”). The CERT Study surveyed over 500 U.S. 
executives, security experts, and others from the public and private sectors. Id. at 3. 
297 As the CERT Study observed: “These insiders are likely to be one step ahead of external 
threat actors because they tend to already know what the company’s crown jewels are: 
those assets that drive cash flows, competitive advantage, and shareholder value. They also 
know where they reside on the networks and how to gain access to them for the purposes of 
theft, disclosure, or destruction.” Id. at 10; see also MCAFEE UNSECURED ECONOMIES, 
supra note 287, at 9 (“Data thefts by insiders tend to have greater financial impact given 
the higher level of data access.”). 
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The addition of a private right of action to the EEA illustrates the 
harmful effects of strengthening trade secret law. The EEA bolsters trade 
secret protection in five major ways: it broadens the scope of 
misappropriation by 1) prohibiting reverse engineering and 2) defining 
misappropriation as unauthorized taking, 3) expands what constitutes trade 
secret information, 4) creates causes of action for attempts and conspiracy, 
and 5) bases trade secret rights on a property theory.298 
Most perniciously, the EEA broadens what constitutes 
misappropriation. Due to the fact that cyber-misappropriation is clearly a 
form of improper means under current law, a broader definition of 
misappropriation only facilitates trade secret suits against other sorts of 
trade secrets misappropriation. And, by creating liability for new forms of 
conduct, the EEA causes collateral damage to other interests. 
The EEA version of misappropriation is broader than that of the 
UTSA in two ways. First, the EEA appears to prohibit many forms of 
reverse engineering.299 Under the UTSA and the common law, divining a 
trade secret by reverse engineering is a proper means for acquiring a trade 
secret and therefore does not trigger liability.300 The EEA does not 
                                                
298 These points are discussed in more detail below. The statute also strengthens trade 
secret law in several more minor ways. It includes more types of information in its 
enumeration of information that qualifies for trade secret protection than the UTSA. See 18 
U.S.C. § 1839(3); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4). In practice, however, this may not 
make a difference because the UTSA categories are so broad that a court might interpret 
them to cover the same types of information enumerated by the EEA. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1839(3); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §1(4). The EEA may also protect general skills and 
knowledge in an employee’s head as a trade secret. See Moohr, supra note 53, at 878 
(“[T]he EEA may be read to protect trade secrets that exist only in the mind of the holder 
against misappropriation through memorization by another.”); see also James H.A. Pooley 
et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177, 
190-91 (1997). For general discussions of how the EEA differs from the UTSA and state 
trade secret law generally, see Moohr, supra note 53 (“[A]n analysis of specific provisions 
of the EEA shows that—in contrast to common law—the new federal law of trade secrets 
offers broad protection to holders of such information. . . .”); Adam Cohen, Securing Trade 
Secrets in the Information Age: Upgrading the Economic Espionage Act after United States 
v. Aleynikov, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 189, 204-206 (2013) (“Criminal laws are often narrower 
than their civil analogues, but in a wide range of areas the EEA pushed theft of trade 
secrets further than the civil—and even state criminal—laws had.”); James H.A. Pooley et 
al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177 
(1997). 
299 See supra note 80 and accompanying text for a description of reverse engineering. See 
also Pooley, supra note 298, at 195-96. 
300 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Comment to § 1 (“Proper means include: . . . Discovery 
by “reverse engineering”, that is, by starting with the known product and working 
backward to find the method by which it was developed.”) Courts have accepted the 
principle of reverse engineering as a form of proper means to acquire a trade secret for 
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expressly prohibit reverse engineering; it prohibits copying, duplicating, 
sketching, drawing, and altering a trade secret without authorization— 
actions necessary for many forms of reverse engineering.301 For example, 
reverse engineering a computer program almost always involves making an 
unauthorized copy of the program.302 Likewise, figuring out how a 
mechanical device works may require sketching, drawing, duplication, or 
alteration.303 The EEA thus effectively prohibits one of the most important 
ways in which trade secrets legally enter the public domain.304 By 
prohibiting many forms of reverse engineering, the EEA restricts follow-on 
innovation. Specialists cannot legally access useful information embedded 
in a trade secret holder’s products to build on and improve them. The public 
interests suffers due to the slowing of innovative progress and reduced 
competition among players in the same industry to produce better products 
and services based on the useful information in the trade secret. 
Second, the EEA collapses the improper means and breach of 
confidence categories of misappropriation in the UTSA into one broader 
form of misappropriation, the unauthorized taking of a trade secret.305 
Under the UTSA, misappropriation by improper means creates liability 
against the world for any wrongful action.306 Misappropriation by breach of 
confidence creates a right only against parties to an agreement of 
confidentiality. Replacing these two forms of misappropriation with liability 
for any unauthorized taking essentially combines the broader features of 
each: the right against the world with liability for acting without permission. 
In sum, the EEA creates a right against the world for any unauthorized use 
of a trade secret, with the caveat that the defendant must know that her 
actions will injure the trade secret holder.307  
                                                                                                                       
more than a century; See, e.g., Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N.E. 12, 13 (1889); Kewanee Oil Co. 
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974); Craig L. Uhrich, The Economic Espionage 
Act—Reverse Engineering and the Intellectual Property Public Policy, 7 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 147, 167 n.160 (2001). 
301 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a)(2), 1832(a)(2).  
302  See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525-26 (9th Cir. 1992); 
see generally Andrew Johnson-Laird, Reverse Engineering of Software: Separating Legal 
Mythology From Actual Technology, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 331 (1992) (describing software 
reverse engineering). 
303 See Pooley, supra note 298, at 195. 
304 Cf. Moohr, supra note 53, at 911-12 (“Reverse engineering . . . is generally viewed as 
crucial to maintaining access to information . . . .”). 
305 See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2). 
306 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1). Liability for misappropriation by improper 
means does not require a relationship between the trade secret holder and the 
misappropriator. See id. 
307 See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a). 
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As a result, the EEA’s version of misappropriation criminalizes 
many forms of conduct that would be deemed fair competition and therefore 
lawful under the UTSA.308 For example, observing a competitor’s 
operations from across the street, entering a competitor’s store to record the 
prices on its products, and studying a competitor’s behavior to learn its 
strategies would all qualify as misappropriation under the EEA.309 Such 
activities are now considered ordinary business intelligence and necessary 
for vigorous competition. Like the prohibition on reverse engineering, 
therefore, the EEA’s broader definition of misappropriation restricts 
competition, to the detriment of the public.  
The third way in which the EEA bolsters trade secret rights is by 
employing a broader definition of what constitutes a trade secret. 
Broadening the definition of a trade secret, unlike broadening the definition 
of misappropriation, facilitates claims of cyber-misappropriation by making 
it easier to prove that the information taken by a cyber-hacker was a trade 
secret. Again, to establish a trade secret claim, the plaintiff must prove two 
elements: that she possessed a trade secret and that the trade secret was 
misappropriated.310 In a case of cyber-misappropriation, the 
misappropriation element is generally straightforward, but the trade secret 
element raises the same challenges as in other trade secret claims.  
The EEA broadens the definition of a trade secret by using the 
public as the measure of secrecy.311 Under the UTSA, to qualify as a trade 
secret, information must “derive independent economic value” from “not 
being generally known to and not being readily ascertainable” by 
competitors.312 The EEA uses the same language but replaces competitors 
with “the public.”313 Interpreted broadly to mean “the public at large,” as 
                                                
308 Pooley, supra note 298, at 193.  
309 See id. at 192-93 (noting that the language of the EEA “might encompass the sort of 
lawful business espionage that has long been permitted by civil trade secrets law—conduct 
such as observing a competitor’s property from across the street.”). The information 
gathered through such efforts, however, might not qualify as a trade secret because it might 
not be deemed subject to reasonable efforts at secrecy. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A). 
310 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a), UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1; 1 MELVIN JAGER, TRADE SECRETS 
LAW § 5:5 (2013) (Jager further divides the misappropriation inquiry into two separate 
elements).  
311 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B). 
312 The language used is: “other persons who can obtain economic value from [the trade 
secret’s] disclosure or use.” UNIF. TRADE SECRETS LAW § 1(4)(i). Logically, however, 
these persons will be competitors because they economically benefit by using the trade 
secret to better compete with the original trade secret holder. See United States v. Hsu, 155 
F.3d 189, 196 (3rd Cir. 1998). 
313 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B). 
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some courts have done,314 this change expands what information qualifies 
as a trade secret. The information known to competitors about a particular 
industry will naturally be greater than the information known to the public 
at large about that industry.315 In most industries, engineers, scientists, and 
other specialists share a body of knowledge of which the public is 
ignorant.316 As a result, the EEA protects more information as a trade secret.  
Again, this harms competition, particularly employee mobility. The 
EEA’s broader delineation raises the specter that employees could be liable 
for taking any industry-specific information with them to a competitor, even 
if all the competitors already had that information.317 In short, an employer 
could use the EEA simply to prevent employees from leaving.318 This 
would have a devastating impact on employee mobility and the cross-
pollination effect so important to a culture of innovation.319 
Moreover, the cost to competition of the EEA’s expansion of the 
trade secret definition likely outweighs any benefit to victims of cyber-
misappropriation. In a civil claim under the EEA, a plaintiff could establish 
a claim for the taking of a broader range of information than under the 
                                                
314 United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 196 (3rd Cir. 1998) (interpreting “the public” to 
refer to “the general public”). 
315 See Julie Piper, I Have a Secret?: Applying the Uniform Trade Secrets Act to 
Confidential Information that Does Not Rise to the Level of Trade Secret Status, 12 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 359, 365-66 (2008) (describing information in terms of concentric 
circles of availability to competitors in an industry). Courts are unclear as to whether “the 
public” in the EEA refers to the general public or to the specialized, well-informed public 
in a particular industry. Compare United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263, 266-68 (7th Cir. 
2002) (“[O]ne could say instead that ‘the public’ is shorthand for the longer phrase, which 
then would be read as ‘the economically relevant public’—that is, the persons whose 
ignorance of the information is the source of its economic value.”), with United States v. 
Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The EEA, however, indicates that a trade secret 
must not be generally known to, or readily ascertainable by, the general public. . . .”) 
However, the language at least gives rise to the possibility that courts will interpret “the 
public” as “the general public.” See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 196. 
316 See United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263, 267 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A problem with using 
the general public as the reference group for identifying a trade secret is that many things 
unknown to the public at large are well known to engineers, scientists, and others. . . .”). 
317 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B). 
318 The EEA’s legislative history indicates that it was not intended to prevent a person from 
using general business knowledge to compete with a former employer. For example, it 
provides that employees “who change employers or start their own [company] should be 
able to apply their talents without fear of prosecution.” 142 CONG. REC. S12213 (daily ed. 
Oct. 2, 1996) (Managers’ Statement for H.R. 3723, The Economic Espionage Bill). 
Nevertheless, the plain language of the statute belies the legislative history. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1839(3)(B). 
319 See Gilson, supra note 74, at 620-29 (cautioning against restricting employee mobility 
because the dampening of knowledge spillovers may hamper innovation and growth). 
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UTSA.320 She could prove trade secret misappropriation not only in cases 
involving information not known to the industry, but also in cases involving 
the broader category of information not known to the public. For example, 
Avogadro’s number—the number of molecules per mole of gas—is not 
known to the general public, but would certainly be known to chemists.321 
As the Seventh Circuit observed in United States v. Lange, taking 
Avogadro’s number from a chemical company without authorization could 
constitute misappropriation under the plain language of the EEA.322 But 
what does it benefit the plaintiff to win such a claim? If she is in the 
chemical industry, her competitors already have the information.323 If she is 
not in the chemical industry, the information is of no use to her. In short, the 
EEA’s broad definition of trade secrets would offer little help with 
protecting information that actually provides a competitive advantage. It 
would, however, help companies stifle competition by preventing 
employees from working for competitors or starting a competing business. 
Fourth, the EEA strengthens trade secret law by prohibiting both 
attempts and conspiracies to misappropriate trade secrets, neither of which 
gives rise to liability under the UTSA.324 As a result, defendants would face 
liability for a much broader range of conduct under the EEA than under the 
UTSA.325 For example, in United States v. Hsu, the Third Circuit held that 
there is no need to prove the existence of a trade secret in an attempt or 
conspiracy charge under the EEA.326 The court reasoned that the attempt 
and conspiracy charges only require proof that the defendant believed the 
information to be a trade secret, “regardless of whether the information 
actually qualified as such.”327  
The attempt and conspiracy provisions in the EEA raise the 
disturbing possibility that a plaintiff could use the EEA to protect 
information that lacked trade secret status. As long as the defendant 
believed the information was a trade secret, for example, she could be liable 
                                                
320 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS LAW § 1(4)(i). 
321 312 F.3d 263, 267 (7th Cir. 2002). 
322 See id. 
323 As a practical matter, she could not prove any actual damages since the information 
would not give her competitors any additional advantage. 
324 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832(a)(4)-(5); see UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (no provisions creating 
liability for attempts or conspiracy). 
325 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832(a)(4)-(5); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT. 
326 United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 203 (3rd Cir. 1998); see also United States v. 
Roberts, 3:08-CR-175, 2009 WL 5449224 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 17, 2009), report and 
recommendation adopted, 3:08-CR-175, 2010 WL 56085 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 5, 2010), aff’d 
sub nom. United States v. Howley, 707 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2013). 
327 United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 203 (3rd Cir. 1998). The court concluded that the 
defense of legal impossibility did not apply. Id. 
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for taking information in the public domain. Again, it is hard to see how this 
feature of the EEA addresses the problem of cyber-misappropriation. The 
public concern in cyber-misappropriation is the taking of real secrets—such 
as when the Chinese army hacked into American computer systems and 
steals secret technology blueprints—not the taking of information in the 
public domain.328 
In civil law, attempt and conspiracy claims lose much of their force 
because the plaintiff can usually only recover the damage actually caused 
by the defendant’s actions.329 Where the defendant does not actually 
succeed in misappropriating a trade secret, the plaintiff will struggle to 
prove actual damages. Nevertheless, in an attempt or conspiracy claim, the 
plaintiff might still be damaged if the information is valuable but did not 
quite qualify for trade secret protection.330 The attempt and conspiracy 
provisions, therefore, raise the possibility that the EEA would extend trade 
secret protection to information now in the public domain. This could harm 
competition, innovation, and free speech. 
Fifth and finally, the EEA bolsters trade secret holder’s rights by 
basing trade secret rights firmly on a property theory, rather than the more 
traditional tort theory.331 First, the language of the EEA clearly indicates 
that trade secret rights under the statute are based on a property interest. 
Instead of referring to the trade secret holder as the “rights holder,” the 
                                                
328 MANDIANT APT 1, supra note 1 at 3. 
329 See, e.g., Matthies v. Positive Safety Mfg. Co., 628 N.W.2d 842, 852 (Wis. 2001) (“It is 
the fact and date of injury that sets in force and operation the factors that create and 
establish the basis for a claim of damages.”); Cockings v. Austin, 898 P.2d 136 (Okla. 
1995) (“A negligent act that does not cause damage will not support the imposition of 
liability.”). 
330 See Julie Piper, I Have a Secret?: Applying the Uniform Trade Secrets Act to 
Confidential Information that Does Not Rise to the Level of Trade Secret Status, 12 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 359, 366 (2008) (classifying valuable information in tiers, not all of 
which would qualify as trade secrets); Robert Unikel, Bridging the “Trade Secret” Gap: 
Protecting “Confidential Information” Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 841, 844 (1998) (explaining that there is confidential information that does not 
technically rise to the level of a trade secret yet continues to be valuable within an 
industry). 
331 The First Restatement of Torts, the Third Restatement of Torts, the UTSA, and most 
state law accepts the tort theory of trade secret rights. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS 
§ 757 cmt. a (1939) (rejecting the property theory in favor of a general duty of good faith); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 reporters’ note, cmt. b, 440 (1995) 
(listing cases); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 commissioners’ cmt. (amended 1985), 14 
U.L.A. 438 (1990) (“One of the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law is ‘the 
maintenance of standards of commercial ethics.’”); 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS 
LAW § 1:3, n.16 (noting that standards of fairness and commercial morality continue to be 
the touchstone of trade secret law in the courts and listing cases). 
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more common formulation under state law, it refers to the trade secret 
“owner.”332 It uses the terms “theft” and “steal,” implying that what is taken 
is property.333 It even employs the word “convert” although the tort of 
conversion has historically been limited to the taking of tangible 
property.334 These terms do not appear in the UTSA or the Restatements.335 
Second, the legislative history bears out this interpretation. The House 
Report explicitly categorizes trade secrets as a type of “property” similar to 
patents and copyrights.336 Third, the EEA treats trade secret rights like 
property. The prohibitions against unauthorized takings and many forms of 
reverse engineering effectively create a trade secret right against the world 
more akin to a property right than a duty-based right of confidence.337 If the 
EEA became the basis for civil trade secret law, the courts would follow 
Congress’s clear intent by interpreting the statute to grant trade secret 
holders property rights across the country.338 
Although the two theories are largely complementary,339 a purely 
property-based approach confers stronger rights on trade secret holders. As 
Pamela Samuelson observed in her study on propertizing information, “the 
word property is a very powerful metaphor that radically changes the stakes 
in legal disputes.”340  
                                                
332 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832(a), 1839(3)(A), 1839(4); see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade 
Secrets: How Well Should We Be Allowed to Hide Them? The Economic Espionage Act of 
1996, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 8 (1998) (observing that the 
concept of owner, as opposed to rights holder, is unknown in state trade secret law). 
333 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832 (“theft”); 1831(a)(1) (“steals”); 1832(a)(1) (“steals”); 1831(a)(3) 
(“stolen”); 1831(b) (“stolen”); 1832(a)(3) (“stolen”). 
334 Val D. Ricks, Comment, The Conversion of Intangible Property: Bursting the Ancient 
Trover Bottle with New Wine, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1681, 1682 (1991).  
335 Note the exception of the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition, which uses the term 
“owner” and “own.” The Third Restatement, however, does not yet appear to be adopted 
by the courts. Lao, supra note 23 at 1650. 
336 H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 4 (1996) (“This category of property includes patented 
inventions, copyrighted material, and proprietary economic information.”). 
337 Pooley, supra note 298, at 193. 
338 Due to the fact that the majority of states now take a tort theory approach to trade 
secrets law, the EEA would effectively change the law in most states. 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, 
TRADE SECRETS LAW § 1:3 n.16 (listing cases by states in which the tort theory 
predominates). 
339 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178-79 (7th Cir. 
1991). 
340 Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a 
Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 398 (1988–
1989). 
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Property rights tend to carry more weight against free speech rights 
than tort concerns.341 Indeed, some have argued that property rights in trade 
secrets trump free speech rights altogether, an argument not advanced with 
regard to unfair competition.342 By basing trade secret rights on a property 
interest, for example, the Supreme Court of California determined that free 
speech concerns had no place in the trade secret injunction analysis.343 In 
contrast, numerous courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have 
concluded that free speech interests must be weighed against trade secret 
rights on the grounds that the trade secret right is based merely on an 
economic interest.344  
Property also confers important rights under the Constitution. In 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, for example, the Supreme Court concluded that 
because Monsanto held a trade secret right in its pesticide data, regulators’ 
requests for the data were an unconstitutional taking of Monsanto’s 
property under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.345 Natural gas 
companies have since relied on this holding to deflect requests from 
environmentalists for information about their hydraulic fracturing 
practices.346 In short, the trade-secrets-as-property approach results in a 
strong version of trade secret law, with significant implications for free 
speech, the public domain, and other concerns like the environment.  
As in the other areas in which the EEA expands trade secret rights, 
the reframing of a trade secret right as a property interest would have little 
effect on cyber-misappropriation claims. The core concern in cyber-
misappropriation is the taking of trade secrets by hackers who sell them to 
                                                
341 Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the 
First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 789 (2007). 
342 See id. at 811.  
343 Id. at 803-04 (“The importance of the trade-secrets-as-property-rights argument as a 
justification for lowering the level of scrutiny in trade secret/First Amendment cases is 
evident from the more than twenty references to property rights in core parts of Justice 
Brown’s First Amendment analysis.”). 
344 See CBS, Inc. v. Davis 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994) (referring to disclosure of a trade 
secret as an “economic harm” without reference to property rights); see also Procter & 
Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996) (referring to the desire 
to avoid disclosure of a trade secret as mere “commercial self-interest”); Bridge C.A.T. 
Scan Assocs. v. Technicare Corp., 710 F.2d 940, 945-46 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding no 
exception from prior restraint doctrine for trade secrets). 
345 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984). The Court found that 
trade secrets were “property,” explaining that “[t]rade secrets have many of the 
characteristics of more tangible forms of property. A trade secret is assignable. A trade 
secret can from the res of a trust, and it passes to a trustee in bankruptcy.” Id. at 1002-04.  
346 See Michael A. Greene, Spilling Secrets: Trade Secret Disclosure and Takings in 
Offshore Drilling Regulation, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 15, *4-6 (2011). 
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competitors, especially foreign competitors.347 These parties have no free 
speech defense and serve no compelling public interest. Therefore, a 
property right in trade secrets fails to facilitate claims against such 
defendants. 
As a criminal law, the EEA may not offer more protection to trade 
secrets than current state civil law. This is because the standard of proof 
under a criminal statute—guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—is much higher 
than the preponderance of the evidence standard in the UTSA and other 
civil trade secret claims.348 Creating a private right of action for violations 
of the EEA would change that. Defendants would face liability for violating 
the EEA under only the preponderance of evidence standard. The stronger 
rights and protections provided by the EEA would result in a much stronger 
form of civil trade secret law than the existing civil law. 
In short, if the purpose of adding a private right of action to the EEA 
is to decrease cyber-misappropriation, it fails miserably. At the same time, 
it imposes significant costs on other interests. Of course, by strengthening 
trade secret law generally, a civil version of the EEA might help trade secret 
holders protect their information against other types of misappropriation. 
The current outcry over trade secret misappropriation, however, focuses on 
the cyber-hacking of trade secrets. By that measure, the costs outweigh the 
benefits of adding a private right of action to the EEA or otherwise 
bolstering trade secret holder’s rights. 
The dangers are not limited to laws that call themselves trade secret 
laws. In some jurisdictions, for example, the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (CFAA) is effectively a civil federal trade secrets law. The CFAA’s 
broadest provision prohibits “intentionally access[ing] a protected computer 
without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, caus[ing] damage 
and loss.”349 On its face, the CFAA might appear to be simply an anti-
hacking statute. Some courts, however, have interpreted the CFAA to create 
liability for employees who access data in violation of a duty of loyalty or 
confidentiality to their employers.350 In such cases, the employees do not 
                                                
347 See supra Part II. 
348 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1970) (establishing the proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard in criminal cases); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 466 (2000) 
(reaffirming the same standard); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 957 (Edward William Cleary 
ed., 3d ed. 1984) (noting that civil cases apply the preponderance of evidence standard); 
see also FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 316-17 (3d 
ed. 1985). 
349 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(C). 
350 See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that an employee exceeds authorized access under the CFAA if he accesses information for 
a nonbusiness reason in violation of the employer’s computer use policy);  Int’l Airport 
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hack their employers’ computers in the sense of circumventing 
technological protections. Rather, they take advantage of access privileges 
granted in the course of their employment.351 Not all courts have adopted 
this approach. Some courts have construed the CFAA more narrowly, 
finding that the CFAA was intended to cover only unauthorized access to 
computers and not unauthorized use of information.352  
The broad theory effectively creates a parallel cause of action to 
trade secret misappropriation. This interpretation of the CFAA, however, is 
even broader than trade secret law because it is not limited to protecting 
information that would qualify for trade secret information.353 The misuse 
of any information in breach of a duty of loyalty to the employer might 
qualify.354  
Leaving aside the controversy as to how the CFAA should be 
interpreted, one implication of this paper is that the CFAA should not be 
construed broadly merely to counter cyber-misappropriation of trade 
secrets. By creating liability for unauthorized access to a computer, the 
narrow interpretation of the CFAA already targets hacking. The broad 
                                                                                                                       
Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that Section 
1030(a)(5)(A) of the CFAA was violated through unlawful access when the agency 
relationship terminated because the employee breached his duty of loyalty by destroying 
files that were employer property); Guest-Tek Interactive Entm’t, Inc. v. Pullen, 665 F. 
Supp. 2d 42, 45-46 (D. Mass. 2009) (holding that employee violated CFAA by using and 
abusing information in breach of his duty of loyalty to his employer). 
351 See, e.g., Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(employee had access to data at issue through employer-granted laptop); Guest-Tek 
Interactive Entm’t, Inc. v. Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45-46 (D. Mass. 2009) (employee 
had unrestricted access to the information at issue due to his position as Vice President of 
North American Sales). 
352 See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2012). 
353 See Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Exceeding Authorized Access in the 
Workplace: Prosecuting Disloyal Conduct under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 50 
AM. BUS. L.J. 281, 329 (2013) (noting that the evidentiary requirements and elements of 
proof of a CFAA claim are far lower than in a traditional trade secret misappropriation 
claim). 
354 See Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263; see UTSA § 1(4). Another controversial issue is 
whether misusing data meets the “damage or loss” requirement for a CFAA claim. See 
Consulting Prof’l Res., Inc. v. Concise Techs., LLC, No. 09-1201, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
32573, at *20 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010) (noting that the debate over “what constitutes 
‘damage’ under the CFAA falls victim to similar debate” as the conflict over interpreting 
authorization terms). Some courts have held that misappropriation of data does not satisfy 
the “loss” requirement of the CFAA and that the CFAA should be limited to hacking that 
causes some physical loss or disruption in service. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 
Speed, No. 6:05-cv-1580-Orl-31KRS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53108, at *26 (M.D. Fla. 
Aug. 1, 2006) (holding that copying confidential information is not damage under the 
CFAA). 
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interpretation not only creates liability for hacking, but also potentially 
creates liability for any unauthorized taking of data. This is unnecessary to 
discourage outsider cyber-hacking. At the same time, it may cause collateral 
damage by discouraging legitimate competition. For example, in a worst 
case scenario, even copying information from a public website in violation 
of a cease and desist letter could be considered a violation of the CFAA.355  
As the CFAA shows, laws need not be named trade secret laws to 
upset the balance of policies at stake in trade secret law. The courts and 
legislature must be careful not to expand laws against hacking to create 
laws that unnecessarily prevent the free flow of information. 
CONCLUSION 
 Despite the alarmist rhetoric, the threat of cyber-misappropriation 
does not merit the bolstering of trade secret rights. Instead, trade secret 
holders would likely take advantage of increased rights to pursue other 
forms of misappropriation. As the example of adding a private right of 
action to the EEA illustrates, strengthening trade secret rights would have 
significant costs. The vitality of our economy depends heavily on vigorous 
competition between private companies, worker mobility, and follow-on 
innovation. Meanwhile, the vitality of our society requires free speech and 
the availability of information important to public concerns. We should not 
risk killing the golden goose for a non-existent egg. 
 
                                                
355 Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 2013 WL 1819999, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (denying a 
motion to dismiss a CFAA claim where defendants scraped information from plaintiff’s 
website despite a cease and desist letter and various efforts to block access). 
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